Ralph Dumain: "The Autodidact Project": Bibliography: The Positivist Dispute: Secondary Bibliography

The Positivist Dispute: Secondary Bibliography

Compiled by Ralph Dumain

Blanco, Jose Jimenez. “The Dispute Over Positivism in German Sociology (III): Adorno, Once Again and Dahrendorf,” Revista Espanola de la Opinion Publica, vol. 39, 1975, pp. 143-160.

Bonss, Wolfgang. “Critical Theory as Empirical Science: Methodological Reflections on ‘Postconventional’ Empirical Research,” Soziale Welt, vol. 34, no. 1, 1983, pp. 57-89.

Brown, S. C., ed. Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979.

See Part Two: Critical Theory and Its Critics debate (pp. 89-147) for opposed positions of Michael Lessnoff, David Papineau, Karl-Otto Apel.

Bubner, Rüdiger; Matthews, Eric (trans.). Essays In Hermeneutics and Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Chase, James; Reynolds, Jack. “The Frankfurt School, the Positivists and Popper,” in Analytic versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy, ( McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010; Acumen, 2011; New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 31-34.

D’Amico, Robert. "Karl Popper and the Frankfurt School," Telos; Issue 86, Winter 1990-91, pp. 33-48. Reprinted in The Frankfurt School: Critical Assessments, Vol. III, edited by Jay Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 198-210.

Drake, Ryan. “Objectivity and Insecurity: Adorno and Empirical Social Research,” Philosophy Today, Summer 2000, pp. 99-107.

Feher, Istvan M. “The ‘Positivismusstreit’: Attempt at an Interpretation of a Recent Debate in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences,” Magyar Filozofiai Szemle, vol. 5, pp. 704-731, 1980.

Fleck, Christian. “Positivism Dispute. The Frankfurt School’s Arguments with Logical Positivism, American Pragmatism, and Critical Rationalism,” Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, vol. 47, no. 2, June 1995, pp. 380-382.

Frisby, David. “The Popper-Adorno Controversy: the Methodological Dispute in German Sociology,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences,” vol. 2, no. 2, June 1972, pp. 105-119.

Gellner, Ernest. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, by T. Adorno, Glyn Adey, and David Frisby; The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34, no. 2 (1983): 173–75.

Goldstein, Leon J. “To Question Foundations,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 9, no. 3, Sept. 1979, pp. 347-356.

Heller, Agnes. “The ‘Methods Fight’ as a Turning Point in Post-War German Theory,” La Critica Sociologica, vol. 47, July-Sept 1978, pp. 6-16.

Heller, Agnes. “The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War Theory,” translated by Mark Ritter, New German Critique, vol. 15, fall 1978, pp. 49-56.

Honneth, Axel. "Bisected Rationality: The Frankfurt School's Critique of Science" in Continental Philosophy of Science, edited by Gary Gutting (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 295-309. (Blackwell Readings in Continental Philosophy)

Jenks, Craig. “The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 9, no. 3, Sept. 1979, pp. 377-379.

Kneer, Georg. “The Positivism Dispute. The Arguments of the Frankfurt School with Logical Positivism, American Pragmatism and Critical Rationalism,” Soziologische Revue, vol. 19, no. 1, Jan. 1996, pp. 92-93.

König, Eckard. “Wertfreiheit Und Rechtfertigung von Normen Im Positivismusstreit / The Positivist Dispute on a Value-Free Science and the Vindication of Norms,” Zeitschrift für Soziologie, vol. 1, no. 3, July 1972, pp. 225-239.

Lugg, Andrew. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, by T. W. Adorno, G. Adey, and D. Frisby; Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 9, no. 4, 1979, pp. 739-756.

McCarthy, George E. “The Rise of Positivism and the Decline of Critical Reason in the Social Sciences: The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology,” in Shadows of the Enlightenment: The Hidden Politics and Ideology of the Natural and Social Sciences (New York University Press, 2025).

McCarthy, Thomas A. "Responses to 'Theory and Practice'," Cultural Hermeneutics, 2 (Fall 75): 355-356.

Meleghy, Tamas. “Karl Popper’s Logic of the Social Sciences. A Reconstruction within His General Epistemological Theory,” Angewandte Sozialforschung, vol. 20 (1997), no. 3-4, pp. 95-108.

Overend, Tronn. “Interests, Objectivity and ‘The Positivist Dispute’ in Social Theory,” Social Praxis: International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Thought, 6 (1979): 69-91.

Abstract: Stemming from critical theory and critical rationalism’s “joint” dismissal of empiricism and subscription to relativism and monism, the positivist dispute in sociology, and the Albert/Habermas polemic in particular, exemplifies the inadequacy of a Popperian defence of objectivity. accordingly, a social realist explication, then refutation, is made of “knowledge-constitutive interests”―the foundation to Habermas’ theory of science. Following the elucidation of “ontological” difficulties, in the form of an “ad hominem’ refutation, ‘epistemological” errors associated with knowledge-constitutive interests are elaborated along the dimensions of: (a) the epistemic function, (b) the meaning and, (c) degenerative problem shifts. Finally, “substantive” arguments against the concept include its pseudo-scientific and relativistic status.

Puchala, Donald J. “The Pragmatics of International History,” Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 39, no. 1, 1995, pp. 1-18.

Ray, L. J. “Critical Theory and Positivism: Popper and the Frankfurt School,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 9 (1979): 149-173.

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to clarify some issues in recent conflicts between critical theorists and Popperians. It tentatively poses the question: whether either of these approaches provide an adequate methodology for sociology. The discussion focusses on four areas of dispute: unity of scientific method; separation of fact and value; rationality; and the concept of totality. These issues are considered in the context of competing definitions of positivism and truth, which are related to political goals and judgments. It is suggested that although Popperians point to serious weaknesses in critical theory, inconsistencies undermine Popper's own position.

Ray, L. J. Reply To Wilson’s “Response To Ray’s ‘Critical Theory and Positivism: Popper and the Frankfurt School’”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 12 (1982): 415-418.

Rhoads, John K. “Social Theory According to Antipositivism,” in Critical Issues in Social Theory, (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1991).

Rickman, H. P. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, by T. W. Adorno; The British Journal of Sociology 27, no. 4, 1976, pp. 509-510.

Rossetti, Carlo. “Concerning "Marxism and the Social Sciences,” Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, vol. 16, no. 2, April-June 1975, pp. 309-312.

Skempton, Simon. Scientism as Pseudoscience: On Ideology Critique and the Demarcation Problem. Cham: Springer, 2026.

Note chapter 4: Value-Freedom and the “Positivism Dispute”. Habermas does not come off so great. Adorno is seen to be friendlier to Popper. Popper himself rejects scientism and proposes that science should be self-reflective. Popper believes in demarcation as does a Marxist outside of this dispute―Althusser. As is to be expected, Marcuse has the most anti-scientific perspective of all. The problem with Adorno and Horkheimer is, according to Skempton, that critical theory tends to erase the distinction between science and its ideological encrustrations and thus there is no basis to distinguish science from pseudoscience. I do not believe this is always the case. Both Horkheimer and Adorno (separately) were not consistent, whereas Marcuse is consistently wrong. According to Skempton, Habermas’ conception of knowledge and interests was influenced by Marcuse.

Skempton is not simply a Popper apologist. In chapter 3, on Popper, Skempton brings in the Marxist Maurice Cornforth’s refutation of Popper. In later chapters, Skempton adduces not only successors to Popper like Lakatos, but others to confront the very possibility of demarcation.

I believe that scientificity, while not ultimately relativistic, is a product of history in which what is really scientific is filtered out from other formerly reasonable ideas that are left behind as metaphysics. The positivist Philipp Frank would agree with this, and while he is convincing, I do not think that positivism is the answer. Scientificity itself is not transhistorical in that a mere formalistic account could explain it. Rather, we have discovered what it is, and perhaps what its limitations may be, as our knowledge of the natural world becomes counter-intuitive and as we broach the boundaries of what from another perspective would be termed the subject-object dialectic. (Note that Christopher Caudwell attacked this problem in the 1930s, without any knowledge of the Hegelian tradition, but did not always handle it well.)

So, the book seems to be a fair presentation of the issues involved from all sides, but I suspect there is more to be said, as I have just indicated. [RD, 19-20 July, rev. 4 August 2026]

Stockman, Norman. Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences: Critical Rationalism, Critical Theory and Scientific Realism. Dordrecht: Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V., 1983.

More from a Bhaskarian critical realist. Reference is made to the Positivismusstreit. Note especially the critique of Popper’s intervention (chapter 6.1, pp. 121-131). [RD, 24 December 2013]

Sukale, Michael. “Science and Value Judgment. On the Value Judgment Debate and the Positivism Controversy,” Soziologische Revue, vol. 14, no. 2, April 1991, pp. 196-199.

Thompson, Kenneth A. Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis; Existentialism and Sociology; The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, by Barry Smart, Ian Craib, Theodor W. Adorno, Glyn Adey, and David Frisby; Sociology 11, no. 3, 1977, pp. 558-561.

Vogt, Klaus. “'Critical Pedagogics'-Critically Examined,” Westermanns Padagogische Beitrage, vol. 28, no. 3, March 1976, pp. 142-151.

Wallisch-Prinz, Baerbel. “Contemporary European Sociological Thought,” The Cornell Journal of Social Relations, vol. 13, no. 1, summer 1978, pp. 7-39.

Wallisch-Prinz, Baerbel. "Critical Reason or Rational Criticism? The Dispute over Neopositivistic Methodology (Positivismusstreit)", Psychology and Social Theory, vol. 1, 1981, pp. 6-11.

Wilson, H. T. "Critical Theory’s Critique of Social Science: Episodes in a Changing Problematic From Adorno To Habermas, Part I.", History of European Ideas, 7 (1986): 127-147.

Critical Theory’s Critique of Social Science: Episodes in a Changing Problematic from Adorno to Habermas. [open access]

Wilson, H. T. "Response to Ray's "Critical Theory and Positivism: Popper and the Frankfurt School," Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 11, March 1981, 45-48.