Key words: metaphysics, logical positivism, realism, materialist dialectics
Content summary: This article is developed in three parts. First, it points out that debates on metaphysics have become an important topic in contemporary philosophy, and people currently declare the end of metaphysics mainly by discussing Nietzsche and Heidegger. Second, the article reviews logical positivism, which strictly prohibited metaphysics, and discusses realism, which has become the focus of current metaphysical controversies. Third, it explores the significance of reconstructing the topic of metaphysics from the standpoint of materialist dialectics. The article argues that the reflection on metaphysics through materialist dialectics reveals the possibilities and tendencies in the process of philosophical thinking, and it will continue to serve the theoretical purposes of various great philosophical traditions.
Today, the debate concerning the stance and content of metaphysics is characterized by peculiar divergences and polarization. On the one hand, the final and thorough overcoming and supersession of metaphysics is proclaimed as a sign of the present age; the label of postmodern thought, used to characterize today's philosophical landscape, finds a certain superficial validation in this. The advent of post-metaphysics is declared a turning point in the history of thought, with Heidegger even proclaiming it a turning point in the history of Being. On the other hand, within broader philosophical circles, the legitimacy of metaphysics is once again being asserted. It is acknowledged that engaging in metaphysical inquiry is permissible; metaphysics is no longer compulsorily excommunicated, and this practice is tacitly, or indeed explicitly, revoked. The defense of metaphysics mounted by post-classical bourgeois philosophy (initiated by Whitehead, then Bergson) is becoming increasingly vigorous. Diverse viewpoints and endeavors, distinct or even conflicting, bear affirmations of metaphysics or declarations favorable to it, articulating or conceptualizing metaphysics in manifold ways, thereby retracting or attenuating its rejection. Even within those currents (such as analytic philosophy) where metaphysics is categorically rejected, a resolute refusal to undertake its re-evaluation persists.
Today, the declaration of the end of metaphysics is primarily articulated with reference to Nietzsche and Heidegger, while post-metaphysics is regarded as a hallmark of postmodernism. The consequence of Nietzsche and Heidegger’s transcendence of metaphysics, and the subsequent linkage of post-metaphysics with postmodernism (though this association does not always align with the self-reflection of proponents of post-metaphysical thought), is that the topic of metaphysics has become a focal point of controversy within the philosophical community. It is grasped in a mystifying manner whose very ambiguity risks deleterious outcomes. This denial of metaphysics is paradoxically accompanied by an infusion of absoluteness into that very same metaphysics, a metaphysics now reified as a dominant force in human affairs, invoking the absent God. Post-metaphysical thinking is identified with post-philosophy, yet it is proclaimed by a certain philosophy in philosophical terms. Even in its most radical forms of transcending metaphysics—including those undertaken by Nietzsche and Heidegger themselves—there persists an intimation that metaphysics is insurmountable. They are all suspected of abandoning metaphysics as a category of rationality only to favor another metaphysics—a pessimistic, concealed, and ultimately speculative metaphysics. Diverse philosophical schools and stances are entirely embroiled in the controversy surrounding metaphysics; the dispute over metaphysics constitutes the central controversy within contemporary philosophical discourse.
Within the debates surrounding Rorty's philosophy, particularly in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature where the topic of metaphysics is ascribed a decisive negative valence within meta-philosophy, the consequences of shifts within the philosophical landscape during the 1960s and 70s also become apparent. These include the waning of the positivist anti-metaphysical fervor, the renewed manifestation of logical empiricism as a distinct philosophical school, and the growing tolerance and recognition accorded to metaphysics both within and beyond analytic philosophy circles. Rorty's views elicited surprise even within analytic philosophy, prompted not only by his critique of specific epistemological tenets found in the traditional canon of analytic philosophy (though this critique at least partially shared the assumptions of the same philosophical inquiry).
Logical positivism, which strictly proscribed metaphysics, enjoyed prominence within American philosophy during the 1950s. Its hostility towards metaphysics and its dominance within epistemology faced little challenge from the linguistic analytic schools of Oxford and Cambridge. A significant and remarkable development occurred in the 1960s and 70s: logical empiricism, a once influential and vigorous current, lost its ascendancy. It subsequently fragmented, its remnants embedding themselves within the broader and increasingly heterogeneous landscape of analytic philosophy. Logical empiricism failed not only because of its relentless opposition to metaphysics; its failure was also seen as demonstrating the invalidity of the proscription against metaphysics itself. A sign of this change is evident today as leading proponents of the analytic tradition assert the need to transcend Carnap's transcendence of metaphysics, while the remaining adherents or followers of the logical empiricist tradition are now defending an experiential metaphysics. Influential representatives of analytic philosophy are engaging with metaphysical problems and themes, confronting metaphysics: Quine under the rubric of ontology, Davidson grappling with the method of truth within metaphysics—not to demarcate its limits, but affirmatively assimilating it into the philosophy of language. Diverse currents within analytic philosophy are now proclaiming their own conceptions of metaphysics.
Today, the problem of realism constitutes the focal point of metaphysical controversy. The very existence and development of the current of scientific realism indeed represents a new issue within the philosophical debates surrounding the topic of metaphysics. Among the diverse variants of realism, currents have emerged such as metaphysical realism (Putnam invokes 'realism' to distinguish it from his own ideationally constructed positivist "internal realism") and a materialist current taking the form of a comprehensive philosophical theory. These currents of metaphysical realism and materialism encompass diverse viewpoints and endeavors. Their emergence conflicts with both the characteristic features of positivism and the mainstream of analytic philosophy—even though some scientific realist viewpoints and efforts originate both inside and outside analytic philosophy, and this remains the case even where the boundaries between analytic philosophy and scientific realism become blurred, particularly in the self-reflection of some philosophers.
Scientific realism opposes positivist metaphysics—an empiricist understanding of philosophy and science—by insisting on the necessity of metaphysics (and indeed, on the use of the term 'metaphysics' itself). Figures like Smart, Bunge, or Kanitscheider hold by no means identical views on metaphysics, yet they all strive for a strong conception of philosophy. This strong conception is at odds with the metaphysical thought of Strawson or Davidson. Bunge, for instance, explicitly claims to defend metaphysics anew (ametaphysia a novo vindicata), demanding not only a metaphysics of science but also a scientific metaphysics concerning the "furniture of the world."
The strong conception of metaphysics within scientific realism is science-related. It reflects the mutual dependency of philosophy and science, and it highlights that the crucial problem is the understanding of metaphysical knowledge—namely, the question of its relationship to empirical knowledge and the problem of justifying this cognitive activity.Materialism finds itself banished from metaphysics in a dual capacity: both as a materialist stance and as a comprehensive philosophical theory. Scientific realism and materialism are certainly not equivalent; however, the practical debate concerning realism is, in effect, a debate about materialism. Putnam aims his critique specifically at materialism because he considers "materialism [to be] the only metaphysical picture with contemporary influence." The proponents of (metaphysical) scientific realism are not materialists; they do not embrace materialism wholesale as a comprehensive theoretical doctrine. Nevertheless, a major part of scientific realism is in essence materialist: "Realism implies... a non-reductive conception of materialism."
The reconstruction of the topic of metaphysics from the standpoint of materialist dialectics reflects: (1) a qualitative shift in the debate concerning metaphysics; (2) the historical development, theoretical foundations, sources, and cognitive potential of materialist dialectics itself; and (3) the historical and theoretical mediation, as well as the continuities and ruptures, between the rationality of 17th- and 18th-century metaphysics and materialist dialectics—content that remains scarcely researched even today. The reception and critical examination of this metaphysics was primarily undertaken by German philosophy since Kant, and especially by Hegel.
This mode of reflection on metaphysics establishes a strong conception of philosophical theory. It is not established in the sense of demanding an unequivocal certainty and finality—i.e., a monism and its claim to ubiquitous validity derived therefrom. Instead, it insists on a critique of metaphysical modes of thinking by anchoring this critique within the systematic philosophical theory of materialist dialectics. The return to the rational metaphysics of the 17th and 18th centuries is not understood as a restoration of metaphysics, but rather as their dialectical sublation. This sublation entails investigating their cognitive achievements, uncovering their problems and substantive content, their transformations and latent possibilities. The process of transcending these metaphysical ideas through their negation, preservation, and development (in accordance with Hegel's concept of Aufhebung) constitutes a dialectical thought process.
Materialist dialectics aims to comprehend the totality of objective reality and its relevance to practice and knowledge. It does not seek to establish a branch of Marxist metaphysics (just as Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz did not treat metaphysics as a discipline separate from other branches within philosophy). It does not lay claim to possessing an additional instrument of comprehension within a uniquely philosophical configuration, nor to a privileged cognitive method, nor does it demand final verification or claim to be finally verified. The aim of materialist dialectics is not to stand above the non-philosophical sciences, as if it could furnish absolute super-knowledge or absolute knowledge concerning them. As a historical form of philosophical cognition, it attains a multi-stage categorial framework—its own content and history, aims and prospects.
A specific characteristic of philosophical knowledge is that the reflection on cognition and thinking is conducted within categories related to objective reality, while cognition and thinking are themselves recognized and conceived as being conditioned by objective reality. To the extent that systematic categories are liberated from the limitations inherent in metaphysical modes of thinking (in the non-dialectical or anti-dialectical sense), the concept of materialist dialectics as systematic philosophical knowledge is not suspect as metaphysics. According to this concept, materialist dialectics is conscious of its own historicity, thereby recognizing itself as striving for systematicity—that is, as moving within the recognized contradiction between systematicity and historicity.
Metaphysics, as a historical traditional theme and a topic of philosophical theory, has been and remains controversial, manifesting itself in two principal ways: On the one hand, debates concerning the conditions, possibilities, and prospects of philosophical knowledge, concerning the historical continuity of specific philosophies, that is, debates over philosophical problems themselves, are subsumed under metaphysics. On the other hand, it serves as the very arena within which various schools and positions contest these philosophical problems. In the current controversy surrounding metaphysics, these two aspects are intertwined. The discussion of metaphysics is intrinsically linked to the controversies over realism and rationality.
Today, the debate over metaphysics is situated within the historical context of traditional metaphysical disputes due to its specific character—a situation arising after the anti-metaphysical critiques mounted by Comte and Nietzsche; before them, figures like Hume, Hamann (Johann Georg Hamann), and Jacobi (Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi) had already engaged with metaphysical questions. Since the 1880s, the end of metaphysics has been proclaimed, followed by declarations of its return; yet, neither the cessation of these debates nor the elimination of the diversity of metaphysical concepts has been observed.
Materialist dialectics' reflection on the contentious topic of metaphysics simultaneously encompasses a critique of the illusion of metaphysics' epochal termination and the assertion of post-metaphysical thinking. It opposes emerging tendencies towards the restriction of knowledge; it reveals possibilities and dispositions within the philosophical thought process; and it continues to work towards uncovering and advancing the theoretical aims inherent in the great philosophical traditions.
Schiller (Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller) wrote in 1788: "Man and power combined are ever a great being, though one sees only partial manifestations. But it is important that one should consider the partial manifestation with the view of the great whole, to which part it belongs, or what role it plays; these questions must be observed with a philosophical gaze." Materialist dialectics rejects a "rupture in relation to the world" and insists on the demand articulated by Schiller in that felicitous moment of reflection: Philosophy thinks with the view of the whole—that is, it observes with a scientific gaze. This constitutes the positive commitment of human understanding and power combined to such thinking and action.
SOURCE:
‘End of the Metaphysical Age?—Marxist Philosophy Facing the Controversial Topics of Metaphysics’, Dang dai guo wai Makesi zhu yi ping lun (Fudan da xue dang dai guo wai Makesi zhu yi yan jiu zhong xin bian) = Contemporary Marxism Review (The Journal of the Center for Contemporary Marxism Abroad, Fudan University), 2001, pp. 241-247. (In Chinese: PDF on this site.)
This article consists of three parts. In the first part, it would be argued that the dispute of metaphysics has become a significant feature in the field of current philosophy, and all kinds of schools and standpoints have been involved. There are two poles in this dispute: one is that the transcendence of metaphysics is the sign of the contemporary era, and the other is that the right of metaphysics is retained in more extensive philosophical sphere. And the end of metaphysics is now discussed in reference to Nietzsche and Heidegger, and post-metaphysics is seen as a characteristic of postmodernism. In the second part, the logical positivism and realism would be discussed. Logical positivism prohibits metaphysics strictly. This school prevailed in American philosophical sphere in 1950s but lost its predominance in 1960s and 1970s. And now the question of realism has become the keystone of the dispute of metaphysics. In the various transformations of realism, there appeared the thought of metaphysical realism and the one of materialism. In the third part, the significance of reconstruction of metaphysics from the standpoint of materialist dialectics would be discussed. Here, what would be examined is (1) the qualitative change of the dispute of metaphysics, (2) the historical development, theoretical base, resource and recognition of materialism, (3) the relationship between materialist dialectics and metaphysics since the 17th and 18th century.
Note:
This automatically translated text comes courtesy of a Chinese colleague. I assume that the Chinese text itself is a translation from German, or less likely, from Hungarian. It is not very important, but given the obscurity of the author, it still pays to document his work as thoroughly as possible. The author disclaims the notion that ‘materialist dialectics’ would ‘seek to establish a branch of Marxist metaphysics’. This is not necessarily counter-evidence to accusations of the author’s dogmatism, but perhaps it suggests some openness as does the concluding argument of which it is a part. The article is also dated as it gives little information about analytical philosophy’s turn to metaphysics, not to mention the absurd directions this has taken. For more on this topic, see esp. chapters 8-10 of this new book ...
Schuringa, Christoph. A Social History of Analytic Philosophy: How Politics Has Shaped an Apolitical Philosophy. London; New York: Verso, 2025.
András Gedö — Vita (Bibliography)
Positivism vs Life Philosophy (Lebensphilosophie) Study Guide
Salvaging Soviet Philosophy (1)
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