Aron Gurwitsch

Rather than commenting point by point on the interesting analysis which my friend, Professor Marcuse, has presented to us to‑night of Husserl's Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (to be referred to henceforth as Crisis), I wish to raise the question as to the perspective under which this work of Husserl's is to be seen. Professor Marcuse started by placing Crisis within the framework of contemporary philosophical thought, of course construing "contemporary" broadly enough so as not to exclude the more or less recent past. Thus he referred to the work of Dilthey, Bergson, Spengler, Gaston Bachelard, Piaget, and others. Far from denying the legitimacy of Professor Marcuse's approach, it must be pointed out that his is not the only possible one. One must, moreover, raise the question as to whether his approach is adequate, that is to say, does full justice both to Husserl's intentions and—much more important—to the philosophical significance of Crisis. A change in perspective and approach might entail revisions of some of Professor Marcuse's formulations and interpretations.

Crisis is the last work of Husserl. After the first two parts, whose central piece is the analysis of "Galileo's mathematization of nature," had appeared in 1936, that is, still in Husserl's life time, in Philosophia vol. I (a long‑extinct periodical edited by A. Liebert in Belgrade), Husserl continued to work on the planned subsequent parts until the onset of his final illness in August 1937. This is mentioned to recall that at the time of his preparatory studies for that book (some of the studies date from the late 20's, some of the relevant ideas can be found, at least in germinal form, as early as 1913), phenomenological philosophy was already in existence. Husserl had already done whatever work in phenomenology it had been given him to do. Crisis has the sub‑title "An Introduction to [end of p. 291] Phenomenological Philosophy." Of course, "Introduction" is not to be understood in the sense of an elementary exposition for beginners. Nor does it mean, in view of what has just been said, that phenomenology is here presented for the first time. Rather it means opening up a new avenue of approach to an already existing body of phenomenological thought. The novelty of this approach, in contradistinction to two earlier books by Husserl which likewise have the sub‑title "Introduction" (about those two books a few words will have to be said at the end), consists in choosing modern science, especially modern physics, as point of departure.

It is possible and perfectly legitimate to isolate Husserl's analysis of Galilean science and to concentrate upon it almost exclusively, as Professor Marcuse has done, provided one does not lose sight of the contextual linkage between that analysis and the late parts of Crisis, as well as Husserl's earlier writings, and is prepared to re‑insert it into that context at some appropriate point. To begin with, I shall follow Professor Marcuse's example in isolating the analysis of Galilean science, that is to say I shall consider it under a perspective other than the whole of Husserl's phenomenology. That perspective, however, must be much wider than the one Professor Marcuse has chosen. It can be none other than the history of modern philosophy of science.

Not being an historian in the conventional and generally accepted sense, Husserl, when he speaks of Galileo, does not mean the historical figure of that name who lived at a certain time, any more than by Galilean science he means the scientific work actually done by that historical figure. Rather Galilean science denotes the science inaugurated by Galileo. The name is used as a symbol for the historical development of modern science from, roughly speaking, 1600 to 1700, that is the constitution of classical physics, and even beyond. Within the meaning of Husserl's definition, Einsteinian physics and quantum physics are sciences of the Galilean style.

What characterizes that style? To say it in one sentence: the cleavage between the world as it presents itself in the perceptual experience of every day life and the world as it is in scientific truth and "in reality." The world as it appears in direct perceptual experience is the world of common sense, called by Husserl the [292] life‑world (Lebenswelt). Its description would require too lengthy an exposition to be tackled here. Some aspects will be mentioned later; to a few points, attention must be called now, however briefly. The things encountered in the world of common experience exhibit chromatic qualities as properties belonging to them in their own right. Human voices, musical notes, and noises of all kinds are accepted as occurrences being in reality as they are given in auditory experience. Finally, there are observed regularities and causal connections, but certainly not of such a nature as to be expressible in the form of functional dependencies in the mathematical sense. Modern science of the Galilean style starts by refusing to accept the perceptual world at face value. Reality contains, embodies, and conceals a mathematical structure. As to its true and real condition, in contradistinction to perceptual appearances, the world (to express it in modern terms) is a mathematical manifold. To pierce through the veil of appearances, to discover the mathematical structure of the universe, to disclose reality as a mathematical manifold, is precisely the task of Galilean science. It is the task Galileo had set to himself and passed on to his successors. Galileo, the founder of physics, as Husserl points out, is not a physicist himself in the same sense as his successors who, as heirs to a scientific tradition, are already in the possession of the "correct" methods of physics; and here methods are not understood in the sense of techniques and technical procedures, but rather in the etymological sense of access and way of approach. Being first to conceive the idea of nature as a mathematical manifold, Galileo had to develop the methods of physics, understood in the just mentioned sense, so as to substantiate that idea. This is what justifies the use of his name as a symbol. The point requires some emphasis, because the contention that the world is not in reality as it looks but that its true condition and constitution has to be disclosed and discovered by means of mathematical construction is not retrospectively formulated on the basis of results attained. On the contrary, it is the guiding principle of the science of physics still to be developed, and it institutes its very development.

For that reason, the contention in question is in need of a justification which is the main concern of the first period of the [293] modern philosophy of science, as represented chiefly by Descartes and Malebranche, in some sense also by Spinoza, and certainly by Leibniz. To illustrate the style of the period of validation by a significant example, let me merely recall that for the justification of the incipient new science and its underlying principle of the mathematical, especially geometrical, structure of the external world, that is, of corporeal nature, Descartes resorts to divine veracity. The first period comes to a close in 1748 when Euler submitted his Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps to the Royal Academy in Berlin. In this memoir, Euler maintains that, although it appertains to philosophy to provide a clarification of the fundamental concepts of physics (the question at issue concerns absolute motion, absolute space and time) the decision as to whether or not the mentioned concepts are to be admitted, and more generally, the decision as to which the legitimate fundamental concepts are, no longer falls under the jurisdiction of philosophy, but of physics. It is in terms of the theoretical exigencies of physics, and in these terms alone, that the foundation problems of physics have to be discussed. Euler's memoir is a "declaration of independence" on the part of physics with regard to philosophy, in so far as science must be accepted and respected as a fact. The task of philosophy is to account for the very fact of science; the goal which philosophy has to reach is set for it from outside of itself. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason follows the orientation initiated by Euler, which also prevails in the several varieties of Neo‑Kantianism in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. The same holds for all contemporary attempts at a logical analysis of science as unquestionably accepted, however they might differ from one another in questions of detail.

It is the historical significance of Husserl's Galileo analysis to challenge and even to abandon the acceptance of science as an ultimate fact and rather to see in it a problem. Husserl is far from questioning the technical, or, more precisely, the intrinsic validity of science, and nothing could have been further from his mind than dismissing it in any sense. What is in question is not science itself, nor any particular scientific theory, but rather the interpretation of science. Husserl concerns himself with the problem of the very existence and the sense of science of the Galilean style, that is the [294] conception of nature as in reality possessing a mathematical structure. Galilean science rests on presuppositions which make it possible, orient scientific methods and procedures, and determine the sense of the scientific explanation of the universe in the Galilean style. Because the presuppositions in question partly were not made explicit and partly were taken for granted, the sense of science had been obfuscated since the earliest phases of its history. Explication of those presuppositions does not mean their denial nor their nullification. It means their elucidation and the clarification of what is built upon them, an account of the grounds on which the validity of science rests and, by that very token, a delimitation of its legitimate validity, that is to say a clarification of the sense of its validity and legitimacy. Husserl's analysis of Galilean science is a critique, but in a sense significantly different from that of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Kant confined the fundamental concepts and principles of Newtonian physics to the realm of possible experience, and he precluded their application beyond that realm. As to the phenomenal realm, Kant, along the line of Euler's orientation, endeavored to demonstrate the unrestricted validity and necessary applicability of the mentioned concepts and principles. Husserl, on the contrary, in calling attention to the presuppositions of Galilean science, raises the problem of its sense, and of the sense and limits of its validity, precisely with regard to what in Kantian parlance is called the phenomenal world.

Among the presuppositions of Galilean science and of the historical Galileo himself, we have to mention, in the first place, the conception that the model and standard of knowledge, knowledge in the genuine and emphatic sense denoted by the Greek term epistémé, is mathematical knowledge, which in Galileo's historical situation meant the geometry of Euclid. In that respect Galileo was himself an heir to an existing and accepted tradition. The disclosure of Galileo's presuppositions, therefore, necessitates going beyond himself and inquiring into the origin of Euclid's geometry. "Origin" is not meant to be understood in historical or psychological terms; what Husserl means is rather origin of sense, or genesis of sense (Sinnesursprung, Sinnesgenese).

In the life‑world in which we find ourselves, we encounter things of a circular contour, or, to express it more properly, things whose [295] contour presents a circular physiognomy. However, these contours are not circles in the strict sense in which the term is understood in geometry, any more than trees whose shape presents a cylindrical physiognomy are cylinders in the geometrical sense. As the etymology of its name indicates, geometry was originally an art of measurement, especially of measuring the earth, demarcating adjoining fields, and the like. Measurement requires a technique and admits of varying degrees of accuracy. The degree of accuracy to be attained in a given case depends upon both the available technique and the purpose at hand. Practical exigencies may, and do, require an increasingly higher degree of accuracy, and this may lead not only to a "better" use of the available technique but also to an improvement of the technique itself. All such improvements are, and remain, in the service of practical purposes. The same holds for the practice of the craftsman who, e.g., working on a wooden plank tries to make its surface smoother and smoother. Here again, the exigencies of the practical situation may demand perfections of the available technique, like the invention of new tools. Here as before, all improvements and perfections are motivated and guided by practical ends and purposes.

In the course of such improvements and perfections, notions of ideal limits may arise, like that of the plane whose surface is of "absolute" smoothness and cannot be made still smoother, that of the straight line which has no width, that of the circle whose points are equidistant from the center, "absolutely" and no longer more or less so as in the case of perceptual configurations exhibiting physiognomical circularity. That is to say, geometrical figures in the strict sense can come to be conceived. In the geometry of Euclid, the geometrical notions still have intuitive content; the figures can be visualized, though they cannot be perceived because they cannot be encountered in reality. One can speak of them as ideal limit‑poles located at infinity in so far as they indicate a direction for the process of progressive perfection, but they can never actually be reached in the course of this process. In this sense, geometrical notions designate models of perfection. Geometrical concepts arise on the basis of perceptual and other experience in the life‑world by means of idealization. Once the ideal limit‑poles have been conceived, the spatial configurations en- [296] countered in perceptual experience, like the trees of cylindrical shape, the lines actually drawn, can be seen in their light and under their perspective, that is to say, the configurations acquire the sense of approximations, more or less close, to the ideal figures which because of their ideality can never be actually realized. Plato compared the relation between the configurations drawn in sand and the geometrical figures which the mathematician has in mind even when looking at those configurations with the relation between the shadows which objects cast on water and the objects themselves.

Ideal geometrical figures lend themselves to exact and definitive determination, valid once forever and for everyone. Geometrical determination is independent of the circumstances, conditions and contingencies of actual observation and measurement. For the same reason, the reference of perceptual configurations to ideal geometrical figures which the former more or less closely approximate is emancipated from all consideration of practical exigency. Of equal importance is the momentous discovery that on the basis of comparatively few fundamental propositions, the axioms, all possible geometrical figures can be constructed and all properties of these figures demonstrated. Geometrical proofs are conclusive, and not a matter of opinion. It can be proved that in Euclidean geometry the sum of the interior angles of a plane triangle equals two right angles and that a denial of this proposition entails a contradiction. Assuming the character of a demonstrative deductive science, geometry proves to correspond to, and to realize the idea of epistémé; it appears as the model and the standard of knowledge worthy of that name.

Idealization is only the first step in the constitution and development of geometry. Soon after Galileo's time begins the algebraization of geometry by means of Fermat's and Descartes' analytical geometry and, later, the differential calculus invented by Leibniz and Newton. The path is opened for a progressive algebraization and even logification of geometry, culminating in contemporary axiomatics and the geometry of abstract spaces. This development is not confined to geometry alone. All of modern mathematics develops in the direction of increasing formalization. In a formalized discipline, of which common algebra besides, incidentally, [297] traditional Aristotelian logic, are the oldest and the most elementary examples, the terms are divested of all intuitive content and are defined merely by the relations obtaining between them and the operations which can be performed upon them. This development culminates in group theory, in which even the relations and operations are left undetermined as to their intuitive meaning and are solely defined by their formal properties like symmetry and transitivity in the case of relations, commutativity and associativity in that of operations. Formalization is tantamount to the development of algorithms, that is to say the establishment of systems of symbols and rules for operations upon those symbols. The operations can be performed "blindly" and mechanically, the only requirement being conformity with the operational rules. Because of their formal nature, algorithmic systems lend themselves to multiple interpretations so that the results of blind and mechanical operations on symbols can receive the appropriate intuitive meaning, according to their interpretation in a given case.

For two reasons it appeared necessary to dwell upon this at some length. In the first place, Professor Marcuse has repeatedly spoken of calculation and calculability of nature. Perhaps he meant prediction and predictability, notions which require too lengthy commentary to be tackled here. At any event, the term calculability betrays too narrow a view of mathematics which is not the science of numbers and magnitudes, but rather of order as such and of the possible forms of order, numbers and magnitudes representing but a special case of order, the most elementary of its possible forms. In the second place, in speaking of the increasing technization of both mathematics itself and the sciences relying on mathematics, that is especially physics, Husserl, in contradistinction to what Professor Marcuse has intimated, does not have in view the practical use to which the results of physics and mathematics can be put, that is technology. By technization, Husserl rather means formalization and algorithmization.

The entities which arise by means of idealization and formalization acquire a semblance of independence, self‑containedness, and self‑sufficiency. Once established, geometrical and algorithmic methods can be taught and learned; they can be transmitted from generation to generation. In using and perfecting them, one [298] proceeds from invention to invention, the accomplishments of later generations surpassing those of earlier ones. Such use and perfection of methods, the gradual development of the several mathematical disciplines, the ever increasing growth of mathematical knowledge as witnessed in the last three centuries, does not require reference to, and explicit disclosure of, the foundations upon which the edifice of mathematics rests. The presuppositions underlying mathematical thought and construction, namely the experience of things as encountered in the life‑world, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the processes of idealization and formalization may, and do, fall into oblivion. Severed from the sources from which they spring, the products resulting from idealization and formalization, that is to say, all the formal disciplines like geometry, the whole of mathematics, and also contemporary mathematized logic, come to be considered as autonomous in the sense of seeming to have no presuppositions outside of themselves. Such proceeding upon the basis of obfuscated and even forgotten presuppositions is what Husserl means by traditionality. It is the right of the positive scientist, the logician, mathematician, and physicist, to remain within this scientific tradition and to abstain from concerning himself with its origin and institution. It is the duty of the philosopher to raise precisely that question in order to clarify and account for the very sense of modern science.

Let us return to Galileo who was an heir to Euclid's geometry and stood within its tradition. That also includes the unquestioned acceptance of geometry as the standard of knowledge in the true and genuine sense. Consequently, if there is to be an authentic science of nature, it has to be fashioned after the model of geometry. Galileo attempts to mathematize nature and he succeeds: nature does lend itself to mathematization. The mathematization of nature can be regarded, and has been regarded by Husserl, as a successful venture; its success assumes the form of an historical process, the history of modern physics, physics of the Galilean style, from its beginnings to its present phase. That means that the venture has thus far proved successful and is expected to prove successful in the future.

It is neither possible nor even necessary to enter here into an analysis of the several steps involved in the application of mathe- [299] matics to nature, the direct mathematization of the phenomena pertaining to motion and dynamics in general, the indirect mathematization of what has come to be called "secondary qualities." Instead we have to dwell upon an interpretation of physics, the “realistic" interpretation, which prevailed until recent times and even in our day has found an advocate in the person of Max Planck.

Because of the obfuscation of the presuppositions underlying the elaboration of the science of physics and determining its sense, this elaboration is not seen for what it actually is. It is the construction of an exact universe, consisting of entities defined and definable exclusively in mathematical terms. This construction is guided by certain principles and is meant to accomplish the specific purpose of providing an ever extending rationalization of observed phenomena and their unitary explanation. Previsions and predictions on a scale unheard of before are thus made possible, which cannot be obtained as long as one relies merely on the regularities as experienced and even as methodically observed in the life‑world. Overlooking the processes of idealization, formalization, and whatever other forms of conceptualization might be involved, processes which are mental operations in and through which the entities, with which the physicist deals, are conceived and constructed, he or the interpreter of physics is wrapped up in the very products to the disregard of the producing activity from which those products spring. Failure to refer the accomplished products and results to the mental operations from which they derive and whose correlates they are, makes one the captive of those products and results, that is to say, the captive of one's own creations, and that is a further aspect of traditionality. Thus, as Husserl expressed it—Professor Marcuse referred hereto—a cloak or tissue of ideas (Ideenkleid), of mathematical ideas and symbols is cast upon the life‑world so as to conceal it to the point of being substituted for it. What in truth is a method and the result of that method comes to be taken for reality. Thus we arrive at the conception of nature (mentioned in the beginning) as possessing a mathematical structure or being a mathematical manifold. This conception is expressed in the famous utterance of Galileo: "Whoever wants to read a book, must know the language in which that book is written. Nature is a book and the characters in which it is written are [300] triangles, circles, and squares." Nature as it really is does not reveal itself in direct sense experience, but must be disclosed by means of the specific methods of mathematical physics. Such disclosure is interpreted as discovery of true reality behind and beneath the appearances. As to the latter, that is the life‑world as it presents itself in perceptual experience, it is relegated to the domain of mere subjectivity. Hence a new science becomes necessary whose task is to account for the rise of the perceptual appearances on the basis of the true and real condition of nature as discovered by the science of physics. It is no historical accident but deeply rooted in the logic of the historical situation of the incipient physics of the Galilean style and its subsequent development, that psychology in the specific modern sense as the science of error has evolved along with that physics and in logico‑historical continuity with it.

Let us approach our problem from another angle. At every period of the historical development, the distinction, according to Husserl must be made between the state of the science of nature at that time, the conception of nature prevailing at that period, or nature as at that time it is believed to be, and nature as it really is. By the latter can only be meant the definitive conception of nature, or nature as it will finally come to be believed to be, when the historical process of the development of science will have reached its end. Nature as it really is denotes a goal towards which the historical process of the development of science is supposed to converge, which the successive conceptions of nature are supposed to approximate. In the interpretation under discussion, the goal is anticipated as attained, though not by us, and, therefore, it is as yet unknown to us. Moreover, the goal—if I may say so—is projected into nature as its true and real condition, waiting to be discovered; in a word, it is hypostatized. Another version, among several, is Leibniz' conception of the omniscient God who, as the supreme logician, is from eternity to eternity in the possession of all knowledge for which we humans have to strive, to the extent to which it is accessible to us.

By now the sense of Husserl's Galileo analysis and of his critique of modern science has become clear. It is overlooked that nature as it really is, the nature of the physicist, in contradistinction to nature [301] as it presents itself in common perceptual experience, is a mental accomplishment, more precisely, the Idea of a goal towards which a sequence of mental accomplishments is converging, an Idea in the Kantian sense. No notice is taken of the mental processes of mathematization, idealization and formalization from which those accomplishments derive as their correlates and results. Finally, sight is lost of the life‑world as given in common experience, upon which the mentioned processes operate in re‑interpreting it in the light of idealized and formalized entities.

Thus far we have confined ourselves to Husserl's Galileo analysis contained in Crisis and to its immediate consequences. Now the perspective must be enlarged. Crisis is only one of three literary documents which together express what may be called the late phase of Husserl's thought. The two others are Formale und transzendentale Logik (Formal and transcendental Logic) and Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and Judgment). Returning to, and continuing, his earlier work in Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations), Husserl, in those two books, concerns himself with the foundations of formal logic and the genesis of its sense; Erfahrung und Urteil being given the significant sub‑title "Investigations concerning the genealogy of logic." As in Crisis, he is brought before the life‑world and led to emphasize the specific mental processes involved in the constitution of logic. The three books form a unitary group and should be seen as related to one another.

It results from these three works that logic as well as mathematics and physics have to be understood as correlates and products of activities of consciousness and mental life. Correspondingly the same can be shown with respect to the life‑world itself. It is the world in which we find ourselves and pursue all our activities, which in our every day life we take for granted. It is permanently experienced by, and permanently present to, us; it is an experienced world and the world as given in direct and immediate experience, prior to all conceptualization, idealization, and formalization. Primarily, the term has a socio‑historical meaning. Properly speaking, there is no life‑world per se. Every concrete life‑world refers to a certain social group at a certain phase of its history, such as the world of the ancient Babylonians, the ancient Egyptians, [302] etc., and, of course, also our own life‑world, the world of the Occidentals in the twentieth century. This is to say that every life‑world is understood, conceived of, and interpreted in a specific way, by the social group whose life‑world it is. The schemes of interpretation are transmitted from the older to the younger generation and so are the socially accepted or approved modes of conduct and ways of coming to terms with typical situations. For this aspect of the life‑world as a social world, I wish to refer to the several writings of my late friend and predecessor in my professorial chair, Alfred Schutz. Though the life‑world refers to a socio‑historical group and, accordingly, changes from group to group, and also for the same group in the course of its history, the question arises as to an invariant structure pertaining to every possible life‑world. Of special interest in the present context are spatiality, temporality, and a certain style of typical causality: what may be called the customs of nature, the habits which things have of typically behaving, with greater or lesser regularity, under given circumstances. All processes of idealization take their departure from those invariant structures.

The analysis of the foundations of both logic and physics leads to the discovery or rather rehabilitation of the life‑world which can no longer be dismissed as a merely "subjective" phenomenon requiring an explanation on the grounds of nature as it really and truly is. On the contrary, it proves to underlie, and to be presupposed by, the elaboration of "objective" nature. Still, we have not yet reached the ultimate, but only the penultimate, presupposition and foundation. The life‑world, in its turn, refers to, and, in that sense, presupposes mental life, acts of consciousness, especially perceptual consciousness through which it is experienced and presents itself as that which it is, that is to say, as that which we take it. It is not until we arrive at consciousness as the universal medium of access (in the sense of Descartes' Second Meditation) to whatever exists and is valid, including the life‑world, that our search for foundations reaches its final destination. As far as the processes of conceptualization, idealization, and formalization are concerned, they now appear in their proper place as acts of consciousness of a higher order in so far as they presuppose the more elementary [303] and more fundamental acts through which the life‑world is given or, in Husserl's parlance, they are built upon pre‑predicative experience. This is another expression of our previous result that the universe of physics, objective nature as conceived in physics, is a product of mental life constructed on the basis of the pre‑predicative experience of the life‑world which equally proves to be a correlate of consciousness.

It is a misconception, frequently encountered, that in re‑instating the life‑world in its right, Husserl meant it to be the final dwelling place for philosophical thought. On the contrary, in Crisis itself he emphasizes again the principle of a universal and thoroughgoing correlation between objects of any description whatever, objects in the broadest and most general sense, so as to include ideal constructs of every kind, on the one hand, and on the other hand, acts of consciousness and systematic interconcatenations of such acts through which the former present themselves. In other words, the Galileo analysis is intended to lead us to the threshold of phenomenology.

Once more we have to widen the perspective, if only for a brief moment. Two other books of Husserl's, usually considered as belonging to his middle period, have the sub‑title "Introduction to phenomenology," neither, of course, in the textbook sense. They are Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Ideas concerning a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy) and Cartesianische Meditationen (Cartesian Meditations). In these works Husserl follows what he calls the Cartesian way, taking his departure directly from consciousness and conscious experience. He endeavors to establish a general theory of consciousness whose central notion is that of intentionality. Especially Ideas presents a general outline of the theory of intentionality which, if fully developed in all directions and ramifications, would be coextensive with a complete phenomenological philosophy.

Beyond this point I cannot go. Embarking upon an exposition, however sketchy and superficial, of the concept of intentionality would lead us so far afield as to trangress the limits within which these remarks have to be confined. I can have no other purpose [304] than indicating that and how the Galileo analysis merges into the mainstream of phenomenological thought. If, as mentioned in the beginning, Husserl's Galileo analysis inaugurates a new period in the philosophy of science, it is because this analysis developed within, and grew out of, the framework of general phenomenology. To be properly understood and not to be mistaken for an expression of an "anti‑scientific" attitude on the part of Husserl, the Galileo analysis must be seen under this widest perspective.

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Only writings which directly or, at least, indirectly, bear upon the phenomenological theory of science are included in this selected bibliography for which even in this respect no completeness is claimed. Among the translations, only those into English or French are mentioned.

1. Suzanne Bachelard, La logique de Husserl, (Paris, 1957.)

2. —, La conscience de rationalité (Paris, 1958.)

3. Oskar Becker, "Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen" in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung vol. VI, 1923.

4. —, "Mathematische Existenz" in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung vol. VIII, 1927.

5. Jean Cavaillès, Méthode axiomatique et formalisme, (Paris, 1938.)

6. —, Remarques sur la formation de la théorie abstraite des ensembles (Paris, 1938).

7. —, Transfini et continu (Paris, 1947).

8. —,  Sur la logique et la théorie de la science (Paris, 1947).

9. Aron Gurwitsch, "Présuppositions philosophiques de la logique" in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale vol. LVI, 1951; reprinted in the collection of essays Phänoménologie‑Existence, (Paris, 1953).

10. —, "Sur la pensée conceptuelle" in Edmund Husserl 1859‑1959, Phaenomenologica vol. IV, (The Hague, 1959) translated into English "On the conceptual consciousness" in The Modeling of Mind (Notre Dame, 1963).


11. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Halle (M. Niemeyer) 1900/01, 2nd ed. 1913; translated into French by H. Elie, L. Kelkel, and R. Scherer as Recherches logiques (Paris).

12. —, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomonologischen Philosophie I, Husserliana vol. III, (The Hague, 1950) translated into English (not an adequate translation) by W. R. Boyce Gibson Ideas (London and New York, 1931) translated into French by P. Ricoeur Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie (Paris, 1950).

13. —, Ideen II, Husserliana vol. IV (The Hague, 1952); reviewed by Alfred Schutz in Philosophy and phenomenological Research vol. XIII, 1953.

14. —, Ideen III, (Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften), Husserliana vol. V, (The Hague, 1952) reviewed by Alfred Schutz in Philosophy and phenomenological Research vol. XIII, 1953.

15. —, Formale und transzendentale Logik, (Halle, 1929) translated into French by Suzanne Bachelard Logique formelle et logique transcendan tale, (Paris 1957; translation into English is in preparation).

16. —, Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserliana vol. I, (The Hague 1950 and 1963); translated into French by G. Pfeiffer and E. Levinas Méditations Cartésiennes (Paris, 1931) translated into English by D. Cairns Cartesian Meditations, (The Hague, 1960).

17. —, Erfahrung und Urteil, (Prag, 1939 and Hamburg, 1948) translation into English is planned.

18. —, "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional‑historisches Problem" in Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 11, 1939; also contained in No. 19; reviewed by D. Cairns in Philosophy and phenomenological Research vol. 1, 1940.

19. —, Die Krisis der Europdischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, Husserliana vol. VI (The Hague 1954); partly translated into French by E. Gerrer "La crise des sciences européenes et la phénoménologie transcendantale" in Etudes Philosophiques vol. IV, 1949; reviewed at length by Aron Gurwitsch in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. XVI, 1956 and vol. XVII, 1957.

20. Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers I, Phaenomenologica vol. XI; II, Phaenomenologica vol. XV, (The Hague, 1962 and 1964); III is in preparation.


SOURCE: Gurwitsch, Aron. "Comment on the Paper by H. Marcuse," in: Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, 1962-1964 [Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science; Volume Two: In Honor of Philipp Frank], edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), Chapter 9, pp. 291-306.

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