MATTER AND MOTION
I. The Concept of Matter in Dialectical Materialism
The problem of matter has at all times been central in philosophy and natural sciences. As the progress of human thought surged forward it touched off the early attempts to get through to the heart of things, to try to discover beneath the diversity given us through our senses, some basic of basics, the prime substance of which everything is made up. Thale's water, Heraclitus' fire, Democritus' atoms, etc.,were all but varied and many attempts to identify this proto‑foundation of all being. The concept of matter, conceived in the womb of the ancient Naturphilosophie denoted, above all, this primordial stuff understood as some absolute source material of which all things under the sun are constructed. The material is not in terms of the Aristotelian counterposition of passive material and active form, but rather material in the sense of proto‑matter, proto‑substance underlying all and sundry.
At the dawn of natural science and philosophy both sought, first of all, to define the proto‑matter and describe its properties; or, as we should put it today, they sought to reveal the structure of matter leaving in the background the properly philosophical problem areas concerned with the opposition of Materialism and Idealismof the relationship of matter and consciousness, the basic question of philosophy. 
That the problem of the structure of matter was focal was, in the author's opinion, historically inevitable and progressive, for it stimulated the scholars in the field to approach matter from the viewpoint of natural science and promoted the emergence of natural science from the bonds of Naturphilosophie. By the same token, it conditioned the metaphysical (in the sense of being anti‑dialectical)  nature of the concept of matter, then in the making, as the primitive construction material orwhich is the same (in the sense used here), the concept of matter as proto‑matter.
If matter is conceived as the absolute primitive construction material, this presupposes precisely the latter's limited, finite character, qualitatively speaking. Human cognition, as it probes deeper into essence, must get through sooner or later to the ultimate basis of all things, to matter as such, which goes to make up these things and which displays a certain finite sum of properties of which it is possible to educe the entire qualitative diversity of the world perceived through the senses.
It is only natural that philosophy and natural science sought to describe matter per se in terms of some finite sum of its inherent properties.
The structure of such a definition appeared to be roughly as follows: matter is all that and only that which possesses properties P1, P2 . . . Pn, where n may be large but necessarily finite. To reveal these P1 . . . Pn properties, appeared to be the basic objective of natural science, and the science‑based materialist philosophy. Merely having recognized the possibility of defining matter as such, one came to understand this matter as some proto‑matter possessed of some finite set of properties which can be discovered by the human mind where upon the latter reaches its absolute end.
While this occurs, materialist philosophy, of course, approaches matter as something extraneous to consciousness and opposed to the spiritual. Thus, as early as the 18th century, the noted French materialist P. Holbach declared when giving his description of matter: "Thus, as concerns ourselves, matter in general is all that which affects in any way our senses." 
One can say that to try to discover the relation of matter and mind has always been central to philosophy; it was tacitly implied in the realization that the answer to the question "what is matter?" was different from the solution of the basic issue of philosophy, i.e., was it to be precisely the understanding of the true character of matter as such, apart from its relation to consciousness?
Until the end of the 19th century the metaphysical concept of proto‑matter had never entered into a too obvious conflict with the progress of science. Yet at the turn of the 19th‑20th century, there came about the "modern revolution in physics." It was as if proto‑matter once caught by physicists was quickly eluding their grasp. What had been hitherto called matter was vanishing, only to be replaced by what was then known as electricity, ether, etc. The phrase "Matter has disappeared" became fashionable among physicists. In the physical parlance of the day the phrase meant in fact that what featured such and such properties and had thus far been known as matter was no longer there. Instead, something new became known, with new unusual properties, and no longer answering the previous definition of matter (matter is that and only that which displays properties P1 . . . Pn). The newly‑emerged something possessed the properties Pn+1, etc., but no longer possessed some of the properties P1 . . . Pn previously ascribed to matter.
From the viewpoint of Dialectical Materialism what disappeared was not matter, but the limit indicating the extent of our knowledge until then. But in order to make this deduction, it was necessary to change the very concept of matter and delimit clearly the properly philosophical purport of the concept of matter and the concept natural science has about the latter's structure. The error was precisely a lack of delimitation underlying the statements of idealist philosophers about the disappearance of matter, though no longer in the sense physicists had meant it. In the parlance of idealist philosophy "the disappearance" of matter meant a disappearance of objective reality, a disappearance of objective content from our scientific theories, a collapse of philosophical Materialism, "dematerialization of matter," etc.
These assertions have been repeated with unparalleled zeal for more than half a century, thus showing demonstrably the importance and significance of developing a new, dialectico‑materialistic concept of matter. As is known, Lenin's definition, to become classical in Marxist philosophy, reads: "Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them." 
It should not be forgotten that this was not at all the first time that the recognition of matter as objective reality was declared in so many words in Dialectical Materialism. Unless we recognize "objects beyond the mind" and objective reality, any materialism would be unthinkable. A basically new point, brought forth by Dialectical Materialism, is the contention that this is exactly the philosophical definition of the concept of matter and there can be no other philosophical definition of matter whatsoever (''per se," apart from its relation to consciousness, i.e., apart from the solution of the basic issue of philosophy). Some opponents of Dialectical Materialism contend that the definition of matter as objective reality independent of consciousness, comprises nothing specifically materialistic in itself, thus objective Idealism, together with the more recent philosophical teachings, such as neo‑Realism or Critical Realism, also recognize the presence of reality totally independent of consciousness. I would argue that this statement is pointless because it admits tacitly the opposition inevitable about matter for objective Idealism and thus something vastly at odds with Dialectical Materialism. The dialectico‑materialistic definition of matter should not be understood as though matter were neither atoms, nor electrons, molecules, protons, etc., but only objective reality independent of consciousness. On the contrary, atoms, electrons and all other forms of existence of matter represent objective reality which exists apart from, and independently of, consciousness. Consequently, Dialectical Materialism insists that all properties of matter, both familiar and hitherto unfamiliar to us, exist apart from, and independently of, the mind. This implies that the philosophical definition of matter by Lenin indicates the unchallenged epistemological baseline of any conceivable science‑based description of matter, that is to say, it characterizes the latter's relation to mind which remains intact throughout all transformations of matter and its inherent properties. And if you go out to challenge my definition, will you please take the bother to prove the possibility of those properties of matter which could be inherent apart from, and independently of, mind? The major outcome of the revolution in physics at the turn of the 20th century, under the aspect of interest to me now, lies in proving the qualitative inexhaustibility of matter and its in‑depth infinity. The dialectical proposition about the inexhaustibility of matter is incompatible with the metaphysical concept of proto‑matter which it rejects unequivocally. The inexhaustibility of matter makes no sense, on principle, of the attempt to define matter as such, apart from its relation to consciousness.
The above is not to imply that Dialectical Materialism fails to see any rationale in the concept of proto‑matter. Methodologically, the concept has proved to be extremely fruitful in history. It always prodded human thought to search after some intrinsic single basis of all perceptible diversity of the world, a basis judged to have an essentially "intrinsic," natural, rather than "extrinsic" and supernatural, character.
This stimulating impact of the concept of matter is not solely a possession of history; now, too, it is obvious in research about the single field theory or the theory of elementary particles, etc. The thesis concerning the advance of cognition toward a more and more profound essence is a key thesis of Dialectical Materialism.
Dialectical Materialism liberates the concept of proto‑matter from a metaphysical interpretation and presumably, admits it as some relative proto‑matter and the recognition of the latter's various structural levels of which none is final and definitive. It is exactly the level of the structure of matter, such as was attained by the mind in each particular epoch, that constitutes the relative proto‑matter.
Natural science has been, is and will be using the term "proto‑matter," but from the dialectical viewpoint, so that it will never be anything but relative proto‑matter. It could be argued, of course, that by the very primitive sense of the word "proto‑matter", is meant exactly prime matter, so it hardly makes sense speaking about relative proto‑matter. It will be noted, however, that in theoretical notions, terms may have other meaning than an etymological one; there is, for example, the meaning they acquire during the course of development of these concepts. Proto‑matter did denote at first this original (absolutely original) matter. As the process of cognition surged forward, the inexhaustibility of matter was discovered and made impossible the further preservation of this former meaning. However, whatever real content is incorporated into the concept of proto‑matter, is not to be thrown overboard, but is to be kept in the concept of relative proto‑matter to designate the knowledge attained at any given stage of cognition, concerning the level of the structure (structural organization) of matter given as objective reality in our sensations.
Absolute proto‑matter could be identified (and so it was) with matter as such, "matter in general." Apparently, this is impossible for relative proto‑matter, for it is not "matter in general" but matter at the given level of insight into its structure. The concept of "matter in general" is to be described now through an indication of the level of its structure presently attained since no level will be final. Consequently, "matter in general" cannot be defined (“per se, in terms of matter as such; rather, to define it, one inevitably has to discover its relation to consciousness, i.e., to provide a solution to the basic issue of philosophy. 
But doesn't such a definition of matter signify a vicious circle? Indeed, we define the concept of matter in terms of the basic issue of philosophy, while to formulate the latter one must already have available some concept of matter. Similar situations of apparently vicious circles characterize much of scientific investigation. In sciences, too, we define fundamental concepts in terms of appropriate laws. For instance, the concept of energy in contemporary physics presupposes the availability of the law of its conservation, whereas the law of conservation of energy pre‑supposes with certainty having available the concept of energy. This kind of "cyclization" is no longer a vicious circle once we take into account the progress of cognition. At first some presupposed notion is formed, using some sort of ostensive definition, and then a law is formed within the limits of which this notion attains a deeper interpretation worked out from its more accurate definition. This definition includes a reference to a given law. Like so many concepts fundamental to natural sciences and defined in terms of a particular law, the definition of matter constitutes a definition in terms of a philosophical "law," i.e., the basic issue of philosophy.
In connection with the dialectico‑materialist concept of matter, I find it desirable to discuss here an issue now being widely debated in Marxist literature. The issue concerns the properties to be included in the concept of matter. Some philosophers propose to extend the limits of the concept of matter enumerating here actually all categorical characteristics: matter is that which is characterized by quantitative and qualitative determinateness; that which has its inherent contradictions; that which is characterized by possibility and actuality, etc. 
This extension of the concept of matter seems to me unjustifiable and emanates from a misunderstanding of the essence and significance of the concept of matter. In defining matter through its relation to consciousness, the inseparability of the epistemological and ontological aspects of Marxist philosophy receives special prominence. Nevertheless, the supporters of the extension of the content of the concept of matter are seeking to describe matter in a somewhat purely ontological manner, regardless of its relation to consciousness or, in any case, in addition to its relation to consciousness. In so doing, they neglect the fact that even including within the concept of matter categorical characteristics, yet in any case this does not make the latter purely ontological. For, as a matter of fact these very categories are viewed in Dialectical Materialism not only as characteristics of reality, but also as "stages of cognition."
Yet someone may object: do not motion, the spatio‑temporal determinateness and the necessary structure of any material object, constitute also the very universal properties of matter? Why not include these in the concept of matter? I think that we are confusing two points here: the concept of matter and the theory of matter.
The dialectico‑materialist concept of matter expresses, in the first place, the opposition between Materialism and Idealism, and solves this task completely, for:
1. Contrary to Subjective Idealism, it affirms positively the existence of objective reality.
2. Contrary to Agnosticism (maintaining that even should the objective reality exist, we can never attain any knowledge of it), it affirms positively that objective reality is given to us in our sensations.
3. Contrary to Objective Idealism, it affirms positively that the objective reality given us by sensations, is the only reality, and there is no other reality either hidden behind the former or basically different from it.
Thus, the concept of matter constitutes an essential philosophical category and an aid in solving the basic issue of philosophy (which V. I. Lenin also called the issue about the source of our knowledge). Objective reality is the source of our knowledge, and the concept of matter has been developed specifically to designate it. Yet another related issue is the one about the properties of objective reality and whether or not it possesses some universal categorical characteristics and, if so, what is the way in which these become revealed in the process of cognition. The answer to these questions is provided by philosophy, (with a foundation in the data of concrete sciences), in its teaching about matter. Philosophy analyzes here motion as a means of the existence of matter in its spatio‑temporal certainty. But to treat these attributes of matter on the same level as a "property" synonymous with objective reality, (which happens unavoidably whenever the above‑mentioned attributes are integrated into the concept of matter in addition to this "property"),  means to overshadow the specific role the category of matter plays in philosophy, or to understate willy‑nilly the importance of the basic epistemological question.
2. The Unity of Matter and Motion. Criticism of Substantialism and Relativism
In the context of the basic issue of philosophy matter is described in terms of its relation to mind, as objective reality given us by our sensations. Among further categorical characteristics of this objective reality the problem of motion is one of primary importance.
Motion is the mode of existence of matter. This all‑important proposition of Dialectical Materialism sums up the quintessence of the problem of inter‑relationship between matter and motion, and commands far‑reaching significance, methodologically. For motion represents precisely the mode of existence of matter, rather than an external, even though omni‑present, property of material objects. The concept of motion as the mode of existence of matter implies that no material object can be conceived of, even though in one's mind, in terms other than those of motion, so that anything we can say about an object in the final analysis is a disclosure of its typical movements or characteristic modes of behavior. "Bodies cannot be separated from motion," Engels averred, "their forms and kinds can only be known through motion, apart from motion, apart from any relation to other bodies, nothing can be asserted. Only in motion does a body reveal what it is ... The knowledge of the different forms of motion is the knowledge of bodies." 
To counter this dialectico‑materialist conception, the metaphysical school of thought advances two equally one‑sided viewpoints.  First, an object has a meaning by itself, apart from its characteristic movements. We can, at least in principle, disregard the object's particular behavior and arrive consequently at some remaining description of the object as such. Consequently, motion is understood here as an externality super‑imposed upon the object which is conceived in principle as possessing some content independent of its mode of behavior. This viewpoint may be called metaphysical substantialism. It was common for the old metaphysical Materialism and found its justification in the 17th‑18th century level of scientific development. Indeed, as motion was understood solely as a mechanical motion, i.e., a simple displacement in space of immutable bodies, it seemed reasonable to consider the essence of these bodies as not being determined by motion, but only taking part in it. So, metaphysical substantialism has a view of a thing or object as the vehicle of motion principally external to it, as a substance possessed of some content independent of motion.
This opinion enters into an irreconcilable conflict with the data of natural sciences, commencing in the latter half of the 19th and especially in the 20th century. It becomes increasingly clear that whatever natural sciences may have to say about their objects comes down to a manifestation of their characteristic forms of motion or modes of behavior. Metaphysical thinking, previously inclined to absolutize substance, was beginning to absolutize motion, with the result that there came about a trend which can be designated, on the whole, as idealistic Relativism. 
Science has proved the absence of any substance that was understood metaphysically, i.e., substance with content independent of motion. And so relativism comes to a total denial of substance i.e., to the statement about pure motion which, allegedly, exists without any possessor.
As an illustration, it will be worthwhile to discuss a rather characteristic way of reasoning which belongs to P. Dirac, one of the leading theoretical physicists of modern times. In a 1956 Moscow public lecture entitled "Electrons and Vacuum," Dirac posed the question: "What is an electron"? and gave the answer, "An electron is a particle carrying an elementary negative electric charge." "But if now," he went on, "someone asks me, "What is an elementary negative electric charge"? "I shall be unable to say anything, except that it is what is transferred by an electron. There is a tautology which implies that we are not likely to progress by asking such questions." "In fact," Dirac sums up, "it is quite unimportant to know what an electron is, but only how it moves, interacts, etc. It seems analogous with the game of chess where it is altogether unimportant what the pieces are made of or what they look like, etc., it is the laws governing their moves that matter." 
What is right and what is wrong in this discourse? Dirac is certainly right in pointing out the futility of any attempts to find out what an electron is, from the standpoint of metaphysical substantialism, apart from, and over and above, what the knowledge of the laws governing the movement of electrons can yield.
But Dirac is wrong to assert, as when he lapses into the relativist position, that we are unable to find out what an electron is, but merely to discover the laws of its movement. This is precisely the kind of opposition rejected in dialectics. Both Metaphysical Substantialism and Relativism (worthy to be called in this sense "inverted Substantialism") proceed in fact from a common basis, namely, that a thing is substance possessing motion, independent of its content. They diverge in that the former recognizes the existence of such things, while the latter, rejecting as it does substance so understood, that is, substance in general, proclaims pure, nonsubstantial motion to be the only existant.
Without counter‑opposing the questions "what is an electron?" and "how does an electron move?", Dialectical Materialism maintains that the answer to the latter gives also the answer to the former. Substance, if dialectically understood, does not exist apart from motion, nor does it have any content independent of the latter; motion is the mode of existence of substance.
In attempting to solve the problem of the feedback of substance as the vehicle of motion, and motion as the mode of existence, neither can be regarded as primary and the other as secondary. Here, there is no cause‑and‑effect relationship but one of two mutually complementary aspects of reality which permanently change places with the historic progress of man's knowledge of inexhaustible matter.
The problem of the primacy of matter or motion "before each other" was approached in a well‑argued fashion awhile ago by I. B. Novik and A. I. Uëmov, though from a different categorical angle, namely, the angle of the categories "thing" and "relation."  This difference is irrelevant in our case, for, if seen in the light of the problem of primacy with regard to each other, the categories of matter (material object) and motion, and thing and relation are quite similar. I. B. Novik quite justly sums up his analysis: "Both propositions: the primacy of relations before things, or the primacy of things before relations are erroneous and represent but metaphysical extremities. While the former proposition suits to some extent the findings of natural science for it does grasp (and absolutizes) some single diminutive trait of the cognitive process of today's science . . . the proposition of the primacy of thing before relation grasps and absolutizes a diminutive trait of the cognitive process of the science of olden times (18th century) when science was taking cognizance of things not yet rising to the cognition of relations." 
The problem of the inter‑relationship of a material object (thing) and motion (behavior, relation) involves a fascinating aspect having to do with cybernetics and mathematical simulation in which the problem discussed presents itself as the issue of the relationship between the study of objects on the levels of their behavior (functioning), structure (constitution) and material (substratum). 
Here we come to deal with the unjust opposition of the "functionalistic" versus "substratum‑structural" approaches to the study of objects, especially biological ones. It is sometimes misrepresented as if there were a special method of functional research proceeding from the analysis of behavior, and another, independent of the latter, method of "substratum‑structural" cognition which proceeds from the analysis of substratum and structure.
A look at the history of human thought reveals that the major trend in natural science in the 17th, 18th and even 19th centuries was from structure to behavior. A system's structure was understood as capable of being studied per se, apart from its behavior, and it was believed that only with a foundation of the knowledge of structure and its elements could one go one step further and account for the behavior of the system as a whole. As was to be expected, one extreme generated another. For the early 20th century saw the emergence of behaviorism which set itself the task to investigate behavior exactly. As this went on, extreme behaviorists would not infrequently discard completely the investigation of structure.
However, the controversy with behaviorism very often involves unnecessary simplifications and, if one may say so, a peculiar kind of "inverted behaviorism." In its extreme forms behaviorism absolutizes behavior, yet it is far from the truth to absolutize structure and support the possibility of studying it apart from the investigation of the singularities of behavior.
My basic thesis is that the opposition of modelizations on levels of behavior and structure to the material is invalid. A break‑down of modelization into these three levels may be feasible only within the bounds of a particular concrete research but in a broader epistemological sense it is necessary to take into account, above all, the relative character of this break‑down and an intimate inter‑relationship in the knowledge of the three model levels.
It strikes me as dramatically inconsistent to try to remove the investigation of structure from that of behavior. The real process of scientific knowledge would demand a start from a general idea about the system and its behavior, then from the fullest possible study of this behavior and then a subsequent shift to the disclosure of structure. Mathematical models are aimed, first of all, toward the study of behavior, of the functioning of the systems being studied. However, the study of behavior assists mathematical simulation to reveal (or make a major contribution to revealing) what is viewed at the given stage of knowledge within the framework of the given system of abstractions as having to do with either structure or material.
It should be noted that in specific case‑studies there has been and will be an independent "structural" approach, proceeding from a structure already known and forecasting its basic behavior (known its the micro‑approach in cybernetics). Where the preliminary knowledge of structure is not available (or poor) the only possible way to know the object is to investigate its behavior (cybernetically termed the macro‑approach). It follows that in the general epistemological sense the study of behavior and the subsequent disclosure of structure on the basis of this study is primary. For mankind approaches the study of any new object with no preliminary knowledge about the latter's structure.
This dialectics of structure and behavior, along with the conception of motion as the mode of existence of material objects becomes extremely clear and pronounced in contemporary elementary particle physics. While in terms of non‑relativist quantum mechanics elementary particles were thought of as something rather independent of their characteristic movements, in relativist quantum mechanics a particle cannot be presented even in thought apart from motion, apart from permanently recurrent transformations.
The very structure of elementary particles is describable in terms of the relation "to transform to . . . " and appears to be something like a selection of probable behavioral modes. Gellman, Rosenfeld and Chew sound quite blunt about it: strongly interacting particles (adrons) are the off‑spring of strong interaction.  This is to say that the properties of the particles, their "substantial determinateness" so to say, is determined by their characteristic strong interaction, the specific pattern of their motion. This inference is highly instructive for it gives yet another vivid proof that the spirit of dialectics is finding its way into contemporary physics!
Incompatible though they are with Metaphysical Substantialism, these profoundly dialectical ideas set off, however, a danger of a new metaphysical absolutization emanating from Idealistic Relativism. This makes it necessary to elaborate in more detail the doctrine of Energetism, an essential variety of Idealistic Relativism.
As a special philosophical trend that acts as a parasite on physics, Energetism took shape in the latter half of the 19th century, due to some special features of scientific development. In the mid‑19th century the principle of energy conservation, one of the key‑principles of physics, became well‑established. After the concept of energy had been developed and its conservation affirmed, it became possible to describe in fairly general terms many physical processes previously held to be vastly different from, or independent of, one another. Under this approach it became possible to abandon all attempts to study the inner mechanism of the processes then going on and describe them as processes of energy conversion. As a result, there came up in physics an extremely effective method which was termed energetic and which was soon to demonstrate its full might, first of all, in descriptive (phenomenological) thermo‑dynamics, a swiftly developing science in the latter half of the 19th century.  It was the metaphysical absolutization of the latter method which brought forth the philosophical Energetism of W. Ostwald and E. Mach.
I shall deal with this point to some length. S. I. Vavilov, in discussing the methods of theoretical physics, pointed out the three general methods according to which it operates: those of simulation hypotheses, of principles and of mathematical hypotheses.  For the purpose of this paper I shall discuss only the former two methods. Essentially, the method of simulation hypotheses consists in making a suggestion about some internal mechanism of the area of phenomena studied and the laws governing the component parts of this "internal mechanism, whereupon the basic characteristics of the phenomena under study are deduced. Perhaps no better instances of the application of this method can be cited than the molecular kinetic theory (classical statistical mechanics) or electron theory (microscopic electric dynamics) both of which rest on the hypotheses of the "internal mechanism" (atomic or electron) underlying the facts observed.
The method of principles involves no hypothesizing about the initial mechanisms of the phenomena being studied. It relies directly on an empirical body of facts. The latter are generalized upon and held to be principles. “In so doing the generalization is confined to an extension of the established empirical fact to a broader group of phenomena. The specific statement of the principle contains only a presentation of experience in the adequate mathematical form."  The principles can be instanced by the law of energy conservation, the principle of permanence of the velocity of light, etc. Typical disciplines, built on the method of principles include, for example, phenomenological thermal dynamics or Maxwell's electrodynamics (macroscopic electrodynamics). The great advantage attached to the method of principles is the immense staying power of the propositions it helps to attain. "The physics of principles," S. I. Vavilov pointed out, "is unassailable, for principles can be generalized, changed somewhat, or complemented but they cannot crumble completely, coming as they do from direct experience." 
The development of physics has shown beyond doubt how fruitful are the methods described above. The theories built on the suggestions about the internal structure or internal mechanism of processes probe deeply into the corresponding phenomenological disciplines, so in the actual history of physics the methods of principles and hypotheses complement each other and prove equally indispensable for the successful development of science. Clearly, at different periods and in different research areas, either method may and often does play the leading role but this is no reason at all for absolutizing one or other of them. Paraphrasing somewhat Engels' words about the relationship of deduction and induction one can say: instead of extolling to the skies one of the methods (that of principles or of hypotheses) at the expense of the other, one would do well to learn to apply either where it belongs.
Coming as it did from the absolutization of the method of principles (emergent at the time in the form of the energetic thermodynamical method), Energetism led toward quite definite philosophical conclusions. The energetists spoke strongly against the recognition of the existence of atoms and declared the only objective of physics was to establish and describe energy correlations. Thus, Mach compared the recognition by physicists of the real existence of atoms to the medieval obscurants' belief in witches and referred to the atomistic hypothesis as a witches' Sabbath. Together with atoms, Energetism rejected the possibility of any vehicle of material energy, for energy was proclaimed as existing in itself, and, therefore, it required no vehicle whatsoever. Surprisingly, the energetists never considered themselves idealists: Energetism, they reiterated, stood above Materialism and Idealism as though bridging the gap between them.
V. I. Lenin laid bare the flagrant inconsistency and falsity of these contentions.  To be sure, Lenin noted, both materialistic and idealistic lines are describable in energetist terms (with greater or lesser consistency). If we declare all being to be but energy and proclaim energy to be but substance and recognize that the substance exists apart from, and independent of, consciousness, we remain still on the grounds of Materialism, though of a desultory and inconsistent kind of Materialism. The well‑defined term designating objective reality the term "matter"we have changed to the term "energy," ambiguous in this particular usage. However, when the energetists admitted the concept of energy to philosophical usage, they did so by no means in order to have it designate an objective source of knowledge but only in order to confuse, under a plausible pretext, the question as to whether or not such a source exists.
Thus they postulated with metaphysical hypertrophy the impossibility, that was evidently revealed by science with increasing depth, of objects existing apart from motion. The energetists declared motion to be the only thing that exists, thus claiming to have overcome the opposition between Materialism and Idealism. In his critique of W. Ostwald, one of the founders of Energetism, V. I. Lenin noted "Ostwald endeavored to avoid this inevitable philosophical alternative (Materialism or Idealism) by an indefinite use of the word "energy," but this very endeavor only goes to prove once again the futility of such artifices. If energy is motion, you have only changed the question, does matter move? into the question, is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take place outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, or are these only ideas, symbols, conventional signs, and so forth?" 
Thus, the attempt by the energists to present energy as a fundamental philosophical category serves little purpose and doesn't deserve criticism from either the philosophical, or physical viewpoint. The concept of energy fails to overcome the opposition of matter versus consciousness; it represents, in effect, every ill‑conceived attempt (using ungainly means) to entangle and camouflage the divergent views. Equally incorrect, from a viewpoint of physics, are the attempts to propose energy as the one and only object of physical research because as we have seen these attempts have their source in the metaphysical absolutization of the role assigned to the energy method in physical studies.
Energetism as a special philosophical trend that came about in the late 19th‑early 20th century suffered a complete fiasco. The progress of physics surged forward in a way that made its leaders admit the futility of their claims. As was noted earlier, the rejection of matter by energetists found its specific expression in the rejection by them of the real existence of atoms and molecules and, accordingly, in their unyielding resistance to the molecular kinetic theory and statistical mechanics based on this theory. The splendid works of A. Einstein and M. Smolukhovsky on the Brownian movement proved with unchalIenged finality the real existence of atoms and molecules.
Nowadays, any talk of Energetism as an integral philosophical doctrine would be an essay in futility. All one can speak of are the prejudices of Energetism, whether arising from a misunderstanding or philosophically ill‑defined terminology, or as a manifestation of the general tendency of idealistic Relativism of which Energetism was but a representation at the turn of the 20th century.
3. The Concept of the Forms of the Motion of Matter
The consistent conception of motion as the mode of existence of matter would demand of necessity an overcoming of the simplified metaphysical views of motion as only a displacement in space, which came about in the 17th‑18th centuries through the rapid progress of mechanics. The view of motion as only a mechanical motion renders impossible the conception of motion as the mode of existence of material objects. It can be asserted that any material object moves and that motion and matter are actually always interconnected, yet this interconnection will still be understood as an externality in relation to a material object whose most fundamental properties will be considered as capable of being also conceived independently of a recurrent movement in space.
The conception of motion as the mode of existence of matter necessarily presupposes, therefore, the recognition of the qualitative diversity of motion itself and the recognition of the existence of qualitatively distinct kinds or forms of motion. "Motion in the most general sense," Engels said, "conceived as the mode of existence, the inherent attribute of matter, comprehends all changes and processes occurring in the universe, from mere change of place right up to thinking." 
F. Engels, for the first time in the history of philosophical and scientific thought, developed the concept of forms of motion of matter, and worked out the general problems of their interrelations and attempted to bring them under some classification, based on the data of his contemporary science. The key‑idea permeating F. Engels' concept is the recognition of the qualitative distinction of various forms of motion of matter and the discovery of their genetic and structural relations with one another. This fundamental idea did and does have a fundamental methodological significance, and hence, further on, I shall concern myself precisely with it.
The essence of the dialectical solution to the problem of the interrelationship between the higher and lower forms of motion lies in recognizing the unity of the opposites: the qualitative distinction of a higher form, and an unbreakable liaison of a higher with a lower form. The dialectical concept of the forms of motion appears here, (the same as in other similar problem areas), against metaphysically lop‑sided tendencies which absolutize one of the opposites and reject their unity as well. In the problem now being reviewed these metaphysical tendencies are:
1. Denial of the qualitative distinction of the higher form of motion and "reduction" of the higher form to the lower one.
2. Absolutization of the qualitative distinction of the higher form of motion and the latter's alienation from its associated lower forms of motion.
The former tendency became known as Mechanicism or Reductionism (without drawing a distinction between them); the latter as anti‑reductionism. I propose to discriminate between Reductionism and Mechanicism by approaching the latter as the denial of the qualitative distinction of more complex material formations, and a "reduction" of the more complex to simple elements. This occurs when one factually denies the distinction of the more complex, i.e., a "reduction" of the whole to a sum of its component parts, and so on. It is reasonable to distinguish the "reduction" from the theoretical deduction (explanation) of the qualitative specificity of complex formations ("higher forms of motion") on the basis of the fundamental laws of the lower levels ("lower forms of motion"). The doctrine that puts forth a thesis which does not at all deny the qualitative specificity of more complex formations is one that well‑deserves the name of Reductionism.
The distinction of Mechanicism and Reductionism makes necessary a more differential approach to the critique of Mechanicism. In our philosophical literature one often comes across a simplified characteristic of Mechanicism when the tag is hung on any attempt to account for the specific regularities of more complex forms of motion in terms of more simple ones. First of all, this mode of explanation begins to reduce, and to deny the qualitative features to its corresponding higher form. But this point of view comes close to yet another metaphysical tendency, namely, the absolutization. of qualitative specificity, and thus closes the door to the latter's scientific elucidation.
For example, one can read in a philosophical paper: "Smart's Mechanicism," wherein this point is clearly shown by the following contention: "Of course, chemistry is not a fundamental science like physics because we hope to have all chemical laws explained away, eventually, in terms of physics, much like the quantum theory provided an account for the chemical bond."  But there is not a shred of Mechanicism seen in Smart's inference cited above. Without rejecting chemical laws, he shows his assurance that they can be explained "in terms of physics." Further, to support his idea, Smart instances the explanation of the chemical bond through the quantum theory. But is it not apparent that this explanation, far from rejecting the chemical bond as a qualitatively specific phenomenon of nature, seeks to explain it, to reveal its inherent character?
The progress of natural science over the past two decades has made very acute the necessity to go a step further. From an oversimplified critique of mechanicism, as a number of our philosophers or natural scientists used to do under the banner of guarding the qualitative distinction of the higher forms of motion, they fall actually into the metaphysical absolutization of this distinction.
I will note also that the opposition to new scientific theories, not infrequently recurrent under the banner of fighting against Mechanicism, engenders among some natural scientists a tendency to reject the dialectical concept of the forms of the motion of matter. So, the further progress of both philosophy and natural science demands a serious analysis into the relationships of the higher and lower forms of the motion of matter.
In order to clarify the point at issue, it is necessary to examine historically Mechanicism and the part it played in the course of the development of knowledge. It should not be forgotten that dialectics is not only opposed to Mechanicism, but also to the other, equally dangerous, metaphysical concept of anti‑reductionism which absolutizes the qualitative distinction of more complex material formations. In the context of animate and inanimate nature, (where both metaphysical extremities come in to their own), this latter concept is known as Vitalism. It postulates that life is so specific that it renders physical and chemical laws totally incapable of shedding any light whatsoever upon vital phenomena, with the result that the latter's essence cannot be fathomed, except through an entirely new system of concepts. Such a system is based on the concept of some vital force which acts against the laws of physics and chemistry.
In order to assess properly the comparative contribution of Mechanicisin and Vitalism in the progress of science, it should be pointed out that at a certain stage of scientific progress the role of Mechanicism was historically progressive. The dialectico‑materialist teaching about the forms of the motion of matter declares that the higher forms of motion of matter, though featuring a qualitative distinction, always contain inside themselves elements of lower forms. With regard to mechanical motion, Engels said bluntly that every higher form of the motion of matter involves a moment of mechanical displacement. And, therefore, this is the first‑priority goal of science but, however, only its first‑priority goal. And there has always been a revelation of this moment of mechanical displacement in more complex areas of nature. Hence, the initial step of genuinely scientific cognition has always consisted and will consist in science seeking to reveal in more complex forms, instead of a purely verbal emphasis of the qualitative distinctions of these formations, those elements of simple forms which are necessarily inherent in them.
Hence, we note the progressive role of Mechanicism compared with Vitalism in the historical progress of science since it demanded an investigation into the physicochemical fundamentals underlying vital processes. In lieu of the plausible explanation which Vitalism was soon to provide, using the vital force and other similar notions, Mechanicism came forward with a real explanation. However it is true that this explanation failed to comprehend all vital phenomena. Mechanicism erred inasmuch as it pushed forward its explanations as all‑embracing, but yet, it did grasp really rather than fictitiously some actual occurrences which it explained through facts, and not exclusively by words. Therefore, at the early developmental stages of a particular science Mechanicism had, indeed, a progressive role to play, though sooner or later the actual progress of the content of science is bound to enter into a conflict with this constricted point of view, and to lead to a revelation of the qualitative distinction which cannot be fitted into the rigid framework of the mechanistic outlook.
From that moment onward, it is the opposition of Reductionism versus Anti‑Reductionism which comes to the fore. The basic question arising for Reductionism, as I understand it, is not a question about the existence of the qualitative specificity of more complex material formations (the latter's recognition is the point of departure and the initial premise of both Reductionism and Anti‑Reductionism), but rather about the nature of this specificity. It is either something primary, original and inferable from nowhere (Anti‑Reductionism) or else it requires an explanation, and ought to be "reduced," (not in the sense of being dismissed, but in the sense of being theoretically deduced), to the lower and more fundamental levels. Reductionism constitutes the precise doctrine which teaches that the qualitative distinction of complex material formations should not be merely postulated, nor introduced at will on the strength of shallow observations. This position manifests a shallow declaration of the difference of one object area from another. But, this position should be properly understood as a result of the legitimate process whereby more simple material formations add up to complexity, as a result of the dialectical process of change of quantitative into qualitative distinctions.
The successful solution of the problem of relations of the higher and lower forms of motion pre‑supposes a true comprehension of one more proposition not often emphasized enough in our literature. The point at issue is the so‑called principal and subsidiary forms of motion. F. Engels notes in the Dialectics of Nature: ". . . the higher forms of motion simultaneously also produce other forms, and . . . chemical action is not possible without change of temperature and electric changes, organic life without mechanical, molecular, chemical, thermal, electric, etc., changes. But the presence of these subsidiary forms does not exhaust the essence of the main form in each case."  This proposition by F. Engels is interpreted by and large in such a way that, for example, the chemical form of motion appears to have principal content independent of the physical form and its regularities, (of the laws of quantum mechanics in the given case). On the other hand, the physical form and its regularities (those of quantum mechanics) possesses some subsidiary content of the chemical form of motion. Again there is a principal content in the biological form of motion which is independent from the physico‑chemical laws, and the latter is some subsidiary element in the vital processes.
Such a stand is signally at odds with the actual content of science. The laws of quantum mechanics by no means constitute the subsidiary content of chemical processes, for it is on the basis of these laws that the latter's distinctions ate to be accounted for. Nor do the physico‑chemical regularities constitute the subsidiary content of vital processes, but again provide the basis for explaining the essence of life.
The approach to the relation of the higher and lower forms of the motion in nature as that of the principal versus subsidiary is contrary to fact, nor does it belong to F. Engels but is in fact a distortion of his actual views. None other but Engels himself, as he revealed the inter‑relationship of chemistry and biology, argued, ". . . chemistry leads to organic life, and it has gone far enough to assure us that it alone will explain to us the dialectical transition to the organism."  In my view it is very difficult to interpret Engels' statement as proclaiming that chemical regularities are the subsidiary content of biological processes.
I maintain that the customary interpretation of Engels' thesis about the principal and subsidiary form does not correspond with the actual content of his concept of the forms of motion. There must be two, clearly distinguishable aspects to the relation of the higher and lower forms of motion. Under the first aspect, the lower forms of motion simultaneously appear also as fundamental, and the higher forms as derivative, to be developed from, and explained through, the fundamental forms. This aspect can be called the aspect of fundamentality‑derivation. The conception of the relation of the higher and lower forms of motion in nature (under this aspect) as that of the principal and subsidiary forms will be a profound error. Such a mistake appears as a metaphysical anti‑reductionist absolutization of the qualitative distinction of the higher forms. For the biological form of motion, it will be a mistake which Vitalism makes.
Furthermore, there is another aspect which can be called the aspect of coexistence of the higher and lower forms of motion. It consists, largely, in that the higher form of motion, besides its peculiar actions (making up precisely its chief content), produces also some individual, relatively independent effects characteristic of the corresponding lower forms. These effects, viewed precisely as relatively independent are, of course, subsidiary and "do not cover in full the essence of the chief form in each case under review." Thus, in chemical processes, besides the chief result of producing new substances, there will always be present some relatively independent effects in the form of some thermal changes, e.g., temperature changes, heat emission, etc. and also some mechanical occurrences, volumetric changes, mass transfer, etc.
Certainly, these effects per se fail to reveal the specific character of chemical processes. They are the latter's side‑effects. But it is equally certain that the relation of the principal, specific content and the side‑effects is but one, and not even the non‑principal, aspect in the interrelationships of the higher and lower forms.
It gives me great satisfaction to note the “rehabilitation” of Reductionism now occurring. In addition to the above‑mentioned article of I. V. Kuznetsov, it will be of great interest to consider in this context Academician V.A. Engelgardt's address to the Second All‑Union Conference on the Philosophical Issues of Contemporary Natural Science.
V. A. Engelgardt, in my view, noted quite justly, "Reductionism, at the present time, requires no defense or argumentation to prove its validity. These proofs are given by the entire totality of contemporary biological research which represents, in effect, none other but the triumphant passage of the reductionist principle.” 
V. A. Engelgardt goes on to formulate the doctrine of integratism, its foremost goal being “a transition from Reductionism which rests on the dismemberment of the complex and the study of the simplest components, to the knowledge of the regularities of biological organization."  It will be pertinent to note here that V. A. Engelgardt never separates Integratism from Reductionism but, on the contrary, emphasizes that "Integratism is to be evolved from Reductionism, proceeding from the latter's results."  Nevertheless, it seems doubtless to me that V. A. Engelgardt's usage of the term "Reductionism" operates essentially in two different senses.
Reductionism as the "dismemberment of the complex and the study of the simplest components" is not the reductionist principle whose "triumphant passage" he lauded above. Reductionism as a methodologically fruitful doctrine never confined itself to "the study of the simplest components." In fact, this study constitutes the first step along the road of Reductionism, whereas its chief objective consists in the theoretical reconstruction of a more complex object area on the basis of the previously revealed laws of a more simple area. Reductionism sets out to deduce theoretically the complex from the simple with the result that it simply cannot have its limit in the "study of the simplest components." Whatever is called "Integratism" by V. A. Engelgardt is the necessary (and the staple) proposition of the reductionist doctrine.
Of course, no one can forbid the use of the word "Reductionism" in the narrow sense either, as is the case in V. A. Engelgardt's words which I italicized, but then any talk of its "triumphant passage" would be far‑fetched. Where Reductionism passes triumphantly, it does so as the program of explanation for the most intimate and specific regularities of life, and on the basis of the fundamental physical laws, and not as "the study of the simplest components."
The doctrine of Reductionism, as I attempted to describe it, constitutes the basic, methodological content of the materialist concept of the forms of the motion of matter and is intimately linked with the eternal urge of human knowledge toward unity. Of course, abstractly speaking, there is nothing as impossible as this in the principal non‑uniformity of scientific cognition. However, throughout the entire history of human knowledge there has been in the forefront the ideal of the unity of knowledge; and this ideal has played a highly productive part, methodologically. The doctrine of Reductionism. (if dialectically, not mechanistically understood) is a doctrine, I presume, most consistent with the aspiration toward the unity of scientific knowledge. The anti‑reductionist proposition which recognizes the equal foundation of physics and biology, to my mind, would be hard to dovetail into the trend toward the unity of knowledge.
The issues discussed above lead to some conclusions.
I. The dialectico‑materialist conception of matter continues to be the principal tradition of the materialist trend in philosophy, and simultaneously overcomes the approach to matter, characteristic of it in the past, through an absolute proto‑matter. It is exactly the philosophical content of "proto‑matter" that one singles out in the dialectico‑materialist concept of matter. At the same time it rejects on principle (because of the inexhaustibility of matter) any attempt to present properties previously discovered by science (and considered fundamental at the present‑day level of knowledge) as being universal to matter in general. This is a vivid manifestation of the essence of dialectico‑materialist philosophy which has always taken a stand against imposing any dogmatic schemes on developing science.
2. The dialectico‑materialist proposition of the unity of matter and motion as the mode of existence of matter, levelled against the metaphysically lop‑sided concepts of Substantialism and Relativism, lies in the basic tendencies of contemporary scientific knowledge, representing the latter's foremost methodological principle.
3. The dialectico‑materialist concept of the forms of the motion of matter, once it is interpreted, as I have attempted to do here, namely, as the doctrine of dialectically conceived Reductionism, allows one to gain a clear view of the problem of the interrelationship of physics and biology, a staple of modern natural science, and charts the ways for their further progress that are most consistent with the trend toward the unity of scientific knowledge.
1 See F. Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy": "The great basic question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps." (K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, in two volumes, vol. II, Moscow 1958, pp. 369‑70.) (Cf. Russian edition). [> main text]
2 The term "metaphysics" is used under various meanings in Marxist and non‑Marxist philosophical literature, as a rule. The latter, views metaphysics as an extra‑empirical conception of the innermost basics, of the principles of the universe, beyond the reach of natural science (or physics in the broad sense of the word). Marxist literature regards metaphysics as the world outlook (and, accordingly, the frame of thought) opposed to dialectics. In the following presentation the terms "metaphysics" or "metaphysical" will be used exclusively in that latter sense. [> main text]
3 P. Holbach, The System of Nature, Moscow 1940, p. 25. (Cf. Russian edition). [> main text]
4 V. I. Lenin, Coll. Works, vol. 14, Moscow, 1962, p. 130. (Cf. Russian edition ). [> main text]
5 I will note that even granted the existence of absolute proto‑matter and the possibility to define matter as such (i.e., precisely as this absolute proto‑matter), it would be a definition in terms of natural science, rather than philosophy. If so, there would be two definitions of matter: that of natural science, in terms of absolute proto‑matter; and that of philosophy, in terms of the solution to the basic issue of philosophy. The negation of absolute proto‑matter leaves the philosophical definition the only one at hand. [> main text]
6 See, for example, V. P. Branskii, Filosofskoie znachenie problemy nagliadnosti v sovremennai fizike, Leningrad State University Press, 1962. (Tr. The Philosophical Meaning of the Problem of Evidence its Contemporary Physics.). [> main text]
7 Quotation marks make sense here because "to be objective reality", "to exist independently of mind," is not a property in the usual sense of the word. In other words, it is not an attribute of matter as such but precisely the characteristic of its relation to mind. [> main text]
8 K. Marx and F. Engels, Correspondence, Martin Lawrence Ltd., London, 1934, p. 322 (Russian text: K. Marx i F. Engels, Izbrannye pis'ma, Moskva, 1948, p. 283.). [> main text]
9 I would like to reiterate that the term "metaphysical" is used in the sense of "antidialectical." The metaphysical thinking so understood is a kind of thinking which absolutizes opposites, whereas dialectical thinking insists on the relativity of opposite categories, and their unity. [> main text]
10 I don't claim that the title is felicitous without reservation, let alone singular. The concept discussed can be equally described as dynamism (force without matter) or as phenomenalism (phenomenon without essence). I am concerned only with the latter's content, not the title. [> main text]
11 See P. Dirac, Electrony i vakuum, Moskva "Znanie" 1956. (Electrons and Vacuum). [> main text]
12 I. B. Novik, "O kategoriiakh 'veshch'i'otnoshenie," ("Concerning the Categories Thing and Relation"), "Voprosy filosofii," 1957, no. 4, p. 221. A. I. Uëmov, Veshchi, svoistva, otnoshenia, ("Things, Properties, Relations"), Moscow, 1963. [> main text]
13 I. B. Novik, ibid. [> main text]
14 Further pages (4‑18) reproduce (with editorial alterations) the author's article with B. V. Biryukov "O nekotorykh gnoseologicheskikh aspektakh modelirovaniia," ("Concerning some Gnoseological Aspects of Modelling"), Coll. "Matematicheskoe modelirovanie zhiznennykh processov), " ("Mathematical modelling of the process of Life"), Moscow, 1968. [> main text]
15 M. Gellman, A. Rosenfeld, G. Chew, "Strongly Interacting Particles," Scientific American 210, 1964, No. 2, p. 93. See the Russian text for this quote: "Uspekhi fizicheskikh nauk," Vol. 83, part 4, p. 723. [> main text]
16 Under somewhat different aspects the method may be termed also thermodynamic or phenomenological or, finally, the method of principles. [> main text]
17 See S. I. Vavilov, Sobranie sochinenii. (Coll. Works), published by USSR Acad. of 1956, Vol. 3, pp. 156‑67. [> main text]
18 S. I. Vavilov, ibid., p. 156. [> main text]
19 Ibid., p. 385. [> main text]
20 V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio‑criticism, Chapter V. Para. 3., Collected Works, Vol. 14, Moscow, 1962. [> main text]
21 V. I. Lenin, ibid., pp. 270‑71. [> main text]
22 K. Marx‑F. Engels, (Collected Works). (cf. Russian text: K. Marx i F. Engels, Sochineniia, 2nd ed. Vol. 20, p. 391.) [> main text]
23 A. A. Glukhova, A. M. Dzhigaev, Znachenie leninskogo analiza revolutsii v fizike dlia bor'by protiv "fizicheskogo idealisma i mechanitsisma," Moscow, 1962, p. 204. (Tr.: The Meaning of Lenin's Analysis of Revolution in Physics in the struggle against "Physical Idealism and Mechanicism."). [> main text]
24 K. Marx i F. Engels, op. cit., p. 563. [> main text]
25 Ibid., p. 564. I should like to refer to I. V. Kuznetsov who holds a similar position toward the question of principal importance discussed herein. He says "lower forms are those of which higher forms are made up or constructed and without which it hardly makes sense. to speak at all about the existence of the higher forms . . . The basic physical forms of motion, far from being 'subsidiary,' are fundamental, basic to all materiaI processes without exception." ("Uchenie Engel'sa o formakh dvizheniia materii i sovremennoie estestvoznanie 'Voprosy filosofii,'” 1970, No. 2, p. 71). Somewhat objectionable is I. V. Kuznetsov's solution of a non‑principal question: "Is the term 'subsidiary form of motion' to be preserved?" I. V. Kuznetsov decides to give it up. To my mind, in the context of co‑existence of the higher and lower forms the term "subsidiary form" can be maintained. [> main text]
26 V. A. Engelgardt, Integratismput'ot prostogo h slozhnomu v poznanii iavlenii zhizni, Moscow, 1970, p. 9. (Tr.: IntegratismFrom Simple to Complex Modes of Cognition in the Phenomena of Life.). [> main text]
27 Ibid., p. 21. (Italics mineL.B.) [> main text]
28 Ibid. [> main text]
SOURCE: Bazhenov, L. "Matter and Motion," in: Philosophical Investigations in the USSR, edited by Frederick J. Adelmann (Chestnut Hill: Boston College; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 1-25.
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