Wills, Vanessa Christina. Marx’s Ethical Vision. New York: Oxford University Press, 2024. xv, 298 pp.
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
1. Introduction 1
Why Think About Marx and Ethics? 3
Analytical Marxism and Dialectical Method 6
Précis of a Marxist Ethics 9
The Structure of the Argument 13
2. Ideology Critique and the Critique of Morality 16
“Ideology” is Not a Wholly Pejorative Concept 18
Rival Analyses of Marx’s “Ideology” Concept 28
Moral Suasion and Marx’s Anti- Utopianism 38
3. A Historical Materialist Account of Human Nature 46
Biological and Social Being in Marx’s Account of Human Nature 50
Human Needs 61
The “Rich Individual” in Marx’s Ethical Vision 66
4. Alienation 72
“Alienation” in Marx’s Early Writings 78
“Alienation” in Marx’s Later Works 84
5. Radical Chains (Marx on Freedom and Determinism) 95
Marx on “the Difference Between the Democritean and the Epicurean
Philosophy of Nature” 101
6. Individuality 117
Interests, Individuals, and Egoists: Marx on Max Stirner 129
Defending Marx’s Methodological Holism 136
7. “Bourgeois” Freedom and Equal Right 141
Freedom 144
Justice and Equal Right 149
Rights and/ in Communism 161
8. Marx’s Critiques of Rival Moral Theories 166
Marx and Christianity 172
Marx and Kantian Morality 177
Kantian Ethics 179
Marx’s Rejection of Kantian Ethics 182
Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy’s Embrace of Kant 186
Later Attempts to Reconcile Kantian Ethics and Marxist Theory 190
Marx on Utilitarianism 194
Marx and Bentham 195
Marx and J. S. Mill 203
Marx and Malthus 208
Conclusion 210
9. “No Particular Wrong”: The Abolition of Morality 213
The End of Sacrifice 215
Meanings of Morality’s Abolition 219
Progress and Perfectibility 236
10. Conclusion 239
What Now? 242
Coda: “The Ruthless Criticism of All that Exists,” Yesterday
and Today 244
Notes 247
Bibliography 279
Index 289
... I continued reading the book, chapter 4 on alienation. The continuity between the ‘young Marx, and the ‘mature Marx’ with respect to alienation has been analyzed many times before, but as I can’t remember any specifics, I can’t make any comparisons. Regardless, Dr. Wills effectively and clearly demonstrates that Marx’s humanistic orientation pervades the entire course of his work. She references a key quote that people make history but not as they choose. This is one key dialectical point. I would also say, before following the chapter further, that Marx’s concept of praxis, or the subject-object dialectic, is key to this puzzle. And speaking generally, as humans have to respond in real time, determination occurs as it occurs rather than being predestined. Put another way, contrary to the false metaphysical interpretation of relativity, we don’t inhabit a block universe. Time is fundamental, and while much can be predicted, specific determinations in real time cannot be, but lie hidden in a fog of potentiality.
I disagree with Wills’ take on Marx and atheism. It is pretty clear that that is what he was, and he initially had no problem collaborating on a satire with his mentor Bruno Bauer. His subsequent projected project with Bauer fell through in 1842 and it was already clear that something was amiss. In Bauer’s radicalization of Hegelianism, the highest category was self-consciousness. Bauer concurred with Hegel that Christianity was the highest form of religion, and for that reason became the greatest threat to the progress of self-consciousness, hence the atheism that got Bauer into trouble. But Bauer never went further, except to sever the connection between his bombastic promotion of self-consciousness and the actual real social world. Bauer’s two 1843 works on the Jewish question crossed the line for Marx, and Marx ridiculed Bauer mercilessly in his essay on the Jewish question and again in The Holy Family. Marx’s dubious use of Jewish stereotypes was likely substantially motivated by his characteristic nastiness in mocking his opponents. Disdain for Bauer’s trumpeting of atheism is congruent with Marx’s contempt for Bauer’s nonsense about self-consciousness, which became more and more politically anti-conscious and overtly reactionary with time. In The German Ideology, Marx mocks Bauer and others who pretend to rise above everything, when they have never risen above reflection.
I concur with Wills’ critiques of Althusser et al. However, I have never accepted a positive notion of ideology as a conceptual formulation, per Lenin and Soviet Marxism, for example. Ideology is most interesting when it is covert, as in the alleged pragmatism of the Democratic Party. But Wills’ argument is different from those I am used to. I think it can be useful, but it still is too schematic for me. I also think that the relevant passage in The German Ideology is overly schematic, but it was addressed specifically to Marx’s intellectual colleagues among the left Hegelians and socialists and their specific illusions. Also, in the beginning, Marx’s famous take on religion, which is excellent as far as it goes, still takes off of Feuerbach, for whom religion is the alienated human essence. But religion is also a projection of everything that is evil and may also be upheld the subordinate classes, and not always just because they have been brainwashed by the ruling class. Various elements and schemas of ideology are inherited from the past, including the basis of superstition and magical thinking, which get transmuted by qualitative social changes and are not always ruling class in their origins. Sometimes they are counter- hegemonic, and sometimes regressive, and often both combined.
Note Marx’s comments somewhere that a segment of the bourgeois intelligentsia will join up with the proletariat. Alvin Gouldner argued this is evidence that Marx obscured the motives of intellectuals.
Althusser: ideology has no history. This reminds me of Roland Barthes: myth has no history… the one thing I liked in Barthes. My nebulous memory tells me that Althusser also claimed that ideology is embodied in social practices, not just a set of ideas in the mind. I liked what Charles Mills wrote about ideology before he got into the “Racial Contract” business.
Wills’ rejection of analytical Marxism, Althusser, and Cornel West is already a step in the right direction.
It has been nearly four months since I left off reading Vanessa Wills’ Marx’s Ethical Vision. One of the virtues of the book is that, though it is a scholarly book, it opens out to the general reader who may not have and may not need to have been previously immersed in the Marxological contexts in which the debates addressed have transpired. The clarity of exposition is useful both to those already immersed in Marxology and to newcomers.
So, I re-enter the text in the middle of chapter 5. The first four chapters, about which I commented spotily earlier are: (1) Introduction, (2) Ideology Critique and the Critique of Morality, (3) A Historical Materialist Account of Human Nature, (4) Alienation. Chapter 5 is Radical Chains (Marx on Freedom and Determinism).
I re-enter at the point where Wills sums up her view as ‘dialectical compatibilism’, a view with which I agree. Abstract arguments about free will (and quasi-scientific arguments against it) are at this point useless. What matters here is the formation of will and its concrete possibilities of transcending what has come before. I was at first reminded of Erich Fromm’s illuminating but less precise treatment of the topic in his analogy with the Pharaoh of the Biblical Exodus myth, who has a choice to make but hardens into a stance that renders him unable to change, thus rendering his fate inevitable. Wills argues Marx’s perspective clearly and convincingly.
Following this is an analysis of Marx’s doctoral dissertation on “the Difference Between the Democritean and the Epicurean Philosophy of Nature.” I could never see the importance of this text as anything other than an abstract exercise transforming Hegelian philosophy materialistically, rather than reading something more crucial into it for Marx’s later critique of capitalism and its political economy. Its importance indeed is with abstract principles, but Wills makes sense of it and shows that it really does have relevance, abstractly, to Marx’s later development. I never saw Epicurus’ view of the swerve as anything more than an ideological intervention rather than a usable concept, but here we get something that makes sense, however abstract, that is, quoting George McCarthy, the “contradiction between material existence and essence (Concept).…” Epicurus implies that matter is not merely acted on by external forces but is itself an active principle. This sets a precedent for the notion that while external forces constrain possibilities, conscious intervention into the material world is also part of natural processes. Wills quotes James O’Rourke to the effect that “Marx himself does not endorse the Epicurean position en bloc” but is sympathetic to its guiding principles that resonate with “the Hegelian philosopohy of spirit.”
I won’t quote the next paragraph in full, but it begins: “It would be Marx’s immediate task in his early writings to move from one level to the other, to move from abstract self-consciousness and freedom to concrete self-consciousness in the political economy.” This itself is a noteworthy statement, especially for what Wills does not mention: Marx’s tutelage by and sharp break from Bruno Bauer, whose obsession with self-consciousness as the essence of Hegelian philosophy became increasingly divorced from serious engagement with reality, retreating into vacuous abstraction culminating in Bauer’s spurious and bigoted argument against Jewish emancipation, which was the last straw for Marx, who subsequently in his early writings mercilessly trashed Bauer.
Wills also argues against the usual contentions of Marx’s hard determinism by carefully examining Marx’s statements in the Communist Manifesto and Capital. Marx also allows for class turncoats, the documented phenomenon of bourgeois thinkers and actors turning against their own class. She ultimately quotes Marx on what would be the inevitable outcome of capital’s trajectory if unimpeded― the “coming degradation and final depopulation of the human race.” Ouch!
There is more to this chapter, rounding out how this all fits in to Marx’s methodology and ethical vision. The subsequent chapters are (6) Individuality, (7) “Bourgeois” Freedom and Equal Right, (8) Marx’s Critiques of Rival Moral Theories, (9) “No Particular Wrong”: The Abolition of Morality, (10) Conclusion, CODA: “The Ruthless Criticism of All that Exists,” Yesterday and Today.
In chapter 6 Wills elaborates Marx’s notion of ‘rich individuality’. The development of the individual is predicated on labor and interaction with others, and the expansion of productive forces, in which respect globalization, by enabling the marshaling of all of the world’s resources at any given locale, has the potential of enhancing human possibilities. While liberalism liberates the individual from feudal bonds, it also creates the abstract individual, theoretically self-reliant but in practice restricted—not a product of a timeless human nature but a distinctively modern product in the era of capitalism. The notion of the atom treated in Marx’s doctoral dissertation is shown to be linked to later statements in The Holy Family and The German Ideology, a linkage that never occurred to me.
Wills also addresses the question of why we should care about human flourishing. Logically, there is nothing else we can care about. She reiterates her position that Marx sweeps religion aside rather than taking a stand on its objective truth value.
The next section is on Max Stirner. I am especially interested in this as I studied this in 1995 and had prepared a session for the Socialist Scholars Conference that was canceled at the last minute. Paul Thomas, cited here, was supposed to be one of my speakers. So: Stirner’s importance is in its challenge to Feuerbach’s humanism, which ends in God’s function being replaced by the abstract concept of humanity to which real humans must submit. Stirner, in turn, substitutes a yet more refined abstraction, egoism. Marx is shown to reject the notion of self-sacrifice to a hypostatized collective.
Wills then argues for Marx as a partisan of methodological holism. While use of this term is not incorrect in the way that it is customarily described, I think the term ‘holism’ is questionable as it also has its roots in objective idealist mystification (Smuts). Dialectics does not mystify the whole. (Note how Engels argues against Dühring’s mystification of the whole.) In any case, analytical Marxism is shown to have botched an understanding of Marx via its bias toward methodological individualism. There is much fussing over this issue in the literature including debate over whether there is a third position transcending this dichotomy.
In terms of historical development the paradox of increasing specialization could also have been emphasized. Alienated social existence in the ever developing complexity of civilizations also enables the perfection of skills and techniques in the increasingly differentiated division of labor—such that scientists, artists in the various genres, medical specialists, etc. become ever more proficient in their domains, while the inhabitants of society inescapably become more mechanical, homogenized, and conformist. The sum total of all these gains and the capacities unleashed are blunted by an alienating social order that disallows them from unequivocally being of benefit to all. Marx addresses this somewhere.
Chapter 7: “Bourgeois” Freedom and Equal Right. The distinction between abstract bourgeois individuality and concrete rich individuality can be seen as mirrored in a distinction between liberal bourgeois conceptions of right, freedom, and equality. Given the empirical failure of bourgeois society to live up to its ideals, should then bourgeois society be compelled to live up to those ideals? The problem here is that the contradictions of practical realization are reflective of their contradictory theoretical content. Marx can be misread as he does not at all “appeal to a liberal conception of justice.” To master the conditions of the proletarians’ existence, socialist freedom must directly challenge the tenets of liberal freedom. Capitalist freedom is not the actual freedom of individuals, but the free movement of capital, and the movement of individuals within it constitutes the appearance of freedom. Free competition effectively subjects individuals to the despotism of market forces. The so-called “rights of man” are less valuable than the “legally limited working day.” The labor contract is, in formal bourgeois terms, the epitome of equality. Substantive equality fundamentally attacks this whole schema. Marx’s attack on it is misconstrued as amoral disregard of rights. (Marx also sees in Hegel the deceptive system of appearances in the state, though Hegel also made a contribution in unearthing the “the ideological requirements of the modern capitalist state.” Marx sees this also in the right of property as came to the fore in the French Revolution.)
For all this, Marx does not disregard the progressive role of the appeal to rights on the part of the proletariat as it struggles towards full emancipation. Hence the ideological character of moral theories does not negate the valuable content within them. Several Marxologists (e.g. Allen Wood and various analytical Marxists) have got this all wrong. Marx’s actual reasoning in Critique of the Gotha Programme is scrutinized. Marx’s alternative to formal equality is summed up in the famous quote “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.” Marx’s reasoning can be found throughout his writings.
Wills then reviews and critiques Igor Shoikhedbrod’s Revisiting Marx’s Critique of Liberalism, disagreeing with his contention that “communist society would feature right and law as superstructural elements.” Eliminating these “formal rights would mean reverting to pre-capitalist social relations,” so he asserts. Wills disagrees, citing the anthropological works Marx and Engels took up, not to regress to the past, but to show that elements of the past contravene the allegedly timeless institutions of the capitalist social formation. Bourgeois rights reflect the reality of alienated labor, i. e. as Marx states, the “separation of property from labour.” Such conception of rights would vanish in communist society. I would say that all this depends on whether a harmonious communist society could actually exist.
The next chapter will address Marx’s critiques of moral theories. This promises to be quite educational.
I will skip over Chapter 8 (critiques of moral theories) for the moment and discuss chapter 9― “No Particular Wrong”: The Abolition of Morality ―that ties everything together. In a communist society, “morality” as such would disappear, but we still need it now. Wills takes us back to Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: the working class is a universal class that suffers universally, “and claims no particular right because no particular wrong, but wrong generally.” It has lost everything, so it must win everything, and abolish all historical forms of oppression as it abolishes its own. The proletariat need not preach or have morality preached to it.
Also, as Marx sees individual and social interest as indissolubly linked, he opposes the concept of self-sacrifice, which also means he rejects any such nonsense as subordination of the individual to the collective. Wills analyzes a document by Marx and Engels I never heard of: “Circular Against Kriege” [May 1846, MECW 6: 45.]” Kriege deviated from what Marx and Engels considered a correct scientific understanding and promoted “self-sacrifice as a communist virtue.” Polemics against sacrifice can also be found in The Holy Family and the critique of Stirner in The German Ideology. The abolition of morality is most vociferous in The Communist Manifesto. Did Marx really mean this, literally? Wills urges us to consider Marx’s statements in “the strongest possible terms.” There is much irony in the relevant passage; the familiar Marxian trope of inversion applies here. Communism seeks to abolish all bourgeois instantiations of their stated ideals. Wills sees morality as different from freedom, individuality, et al, i.e. bound to particular stages of historical development. Wills considers alternative interpretations of Marx’s strongest claims, of which the most plausible is Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit, but even that doesn’t really pass the test. Then we come to Marx’s comments on the liberation of the senses and engagement with Aristotle. Wills warns us not to interpret Marx’s projections for the future idealistically, as only the future can determine how these notions will be actualized. Very well, for from the standpoint of the present, all this seems far-fetched.
The final section of this chapter is “Progress and Perfectibility.”
“What makes Marx’s approach importantly distinct is not that he thinks morality has validity only for those conditions in which there is no mutual recognition of one another’s humanity and in which the world is not already arranged in a manner conducive to the universal satisfaction of human needs. This, he has in common with other moral theorists before and after him. What makes Marx’s view distinct is the claim that such conditions need not be a mere hypothetical dream. They are features of a world that can be achieved.”
While Marx can be accused of an unrealistic perfectionism, Wills claims this is not so. Well, it is all hypothetical, and it appears that our ship as humans has sailed. Bye.
My final task is to backtrack to and summarize chapter 8 (Marx’s Critiques of Rival Moral Theories). This carries a special interest in addition to its place in the overall argument. This chapter picks up where chapter 7 left off and turns to critiques of Christian ethics, Kantianism, Utilitarianism, and Malthusianism. Wills reiterates her objection to the fallacious notion that Marx rejects any sort of normative argument. Puzzling to many is Marx’s hostility to moral theories that promote sound values. Their purely prescriptive characteristics, obscuring the realities in which people act, is a key problem, and in fact are limited ideological reflections of the very limitations of the actual societies they purportedly address. Both Christian escapism and Kantian autonomy present unrealistic views of will formation.
“For Marx, the resolution to social antagonisms is not to scorn private interest in favor of universally valid moral law, nor to eschew the content of the will in favor of its abstract form. Rather, Marx’s method is on the one hand, to analyze the content of the particular wills and interests that stand arrayed against one another in social conflict, and on the other, to reason about which of these is poised, through the pursuit of their really existing material interests, to reconcile the social antagonisms that make strife, domination, and chaos the likeliest outcomes of individual human beings all seeking to satisfy their individual desires within a class society.”
Utilitarianism is the most capitalist of these theories and is a species of consequentialism. It does not appear to have a firm metaphysical foundation. It may appear to be ecumenical (pluralistic), but in fact reduces interest to a single, quantitative criterion, a reflection of the capitalist money economy.
Marx’s general views of religion are easy to locate, so I won’t summarize them here. Wills correctly notes that the critique of religion was a common object of concern of the Young Hegelians. Marx differs in addressing the underlying material conditions that sustain religion and that merely debunking its claims won’t eliminate it. Marx is nonetheless opposed to all manifestations of servility and self-denial. One example is Marx’s critique in The Holy Family of Eugene Sue’s novel Les Mystères de Paris, which preaches to an erstwhile sex worker renunciation and submission to God. In response to an anti-socialist bourgeois moralist, Marx, in one of my favorite quotes, puts “the social principles of Christianity” on blast. Marx aims at making human happiness a real thing, not substituting illusions for it. Once again I vehemently disagree with Wills’ contention that Marx was not an atheist. He most certainly was, but here too he opposed the idealist preaching mentality exemplified by his former mentor and collaborator Bruno Bauer.
Marx emerged out of German Idealism (which perhaps begins with Kant, though this contention is disputed), and recognizing Hegel as its culmination and the culmination of bourgeois philosophy, sought to supersede the whole tradition. Various Marxists have been tempted by Kant and there is a long history of incorporating Kant. Marx only sporadically addresses him. If material reality is causal and deterministic, what room is there for freedom? For Kant, there is a separate realm of free will and a determinate moral law which is supposed to supervene material causality (heteronomy), a totally abstract categorical imperative. Good will is separate from consequence.
What good is it? This is how Marx views its existence: “Kant’s good will fully corresponds to the impotence, depression, and wretchedness of the German burghers, whose petty interests were never capable of developing into the common, national interests of a class.” Marx’s objections did not stop Marxist theoreticians from Bernstein on from combining Kant and Marx. There may be some basis for appeal, for example, treating other humans as ends rather than means, but Kant’s principle has no connection to empirical circumstances in which this injunction is or is not realizable. Kant also ignores the actual formation of will, which itself is formed under and by material conditions. And liberalism in general bases its ideology on this illusion. Marx:
“The characteristic form which French liberalism, based on real class interests, assumed in Germany we find again in Kant. Neither he, nor the German middle class, whose whitewashing spokesman he was, noticed that these theoretical ideas of the bourgeoisie had as their basis material interests and a will that was conditioned and determined by the material relations of production. Kant, therefore, separated this theoretical expression from the interests which it expressed; he made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of “free will,” of the will in and for itself, of the human will, and so converted it into purely ideological conceptual determinations and moral postulates.” [Marx, The German Ideology, MECW 5:195.]
The case of the revisionist Eduard Bernstein is well-known among those who know the history of Marxism. Bernstein assumed Marx was a historical determinist, that crisis in capitalism is not inevitable, and therefore Kantian morality is required to supplement Marxism. Kautsky rebutted Bernstein. Max Adler (1925) attempted a Kantian synthesis, as did Philip Kain (1988). Kain sees an epistemological break in Marx such that moral responsibility disappears from his world outlook. Contributors to a 2007 issue of Kantian Review revive the old issues. For example, if a revolution is not immanent, if historical materialism is value-free, how does one urge on what should be? Wills refutes all of these default presumptions. Marx does not preach to people in general, but appeals to the real interests of a class.
Wills then turns to utilitarianism, beginning with Marx’s utter contempt for Jeremy Bentham. Bentham is not favored much these days, but Marx’s critique will illuminate the flaws of the entire tradition. Contrary to Wood, Wills claims that Marx understood Bentham quite well. What is wrong with the principle of “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”? But Bentham himself defended the economic status quo and the inviolability of private property: no redistribution of wealth for Bentham. Bentham had a strange approach to quantifying suffering. And the jubilation of the masses didn’t count. An additional presumption, note by George Brenkert, is that the calculation of the greatest good is based on the calculation of individual utilities. With this in mind, Bentham’s method of calculation is consistent with his principles.
According to Marx, Bentham dogmatically posits a static view of social productivity and predicates utility on the presumed needs of the shopkeeper. Marx also contests assumptions about human nature. The single relation of utility is a dubious, reductive basis for positing human nature, and (another favorite quote of mine):
“To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticise all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch.”
Marx had much more respect for John Stuart Mill. But Mill eternalized the capitalist mode of production while assuming that distribution could be reformed. Distribution is tied to capitalist production for profit. Liberalism cannot deliver on its promises. Wills disagrees with G. A. Cohen’s objection to Marx’s argument. She concludes that while Marx may have some sympathy for Mill, Mill’s view of political economy and the possibilities for instituting fairness are limited.
Marx rejects Malthus’ claim that poverty is caused by overpopulation and that a proper solution would be to put a brake on reproduction. The reserve army of the unemployed is of real benefit to the bourgeoisie, the greater the reserve, the better. Marx has contempt for Malthus’ attempt to blame the poor for their poverty. The entire history of social Darwinism is implicated here.
Wills
concludes that all these controversies are not mere ideological
museum pieces but are relevant to today’s conditions. And also,
resorting to moral exhortation as an engine of social change is
useless.
A cold-blooded stance on revolution based solely on a putative calculation of a balance of forces (with some moralism coating the cake) can be found in Stalin and his successors, but that is not Marx. A more sophisticated critique of Marx and more generally the intelligentsia’s investment in revolutionary change can be found in Alvin Gouldner’s analysis of the intellectuals’ culture of critical discourse. Marx states somewhere that a section of the intelligentsia will go over to the revolution, which could simply mean siding with the winners, and Gouldner is not convinced that this is an adequate explanation. But that bare statement by Marx is just a piece of polemic which does not pretend to delve into the moral instincts of the revolutionary intellectual. In any case, Marx could not possibly hold to a notion of pure disinterestedness or cold-blooded calculation, which itself is based on an ideological illusion. Let us consult the young Marx, to his famous criticism of religion. There he addresses the alienated human condition, mostly of the oppressed, in general, but this one statement applies as much to the intellectuals as to anyone else: “But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world.” This is the germ of the notion of praxis, which presumes motivated engagement as well as the objective world in which humans ineluctably orient themselves.
Others have argued against the notion that Marx is essentially an amoralist and thus contradicts himself displaying his own passions. But Wills has constructed a comprehensive analysis tying all aspects of Marx’s thought together in which his moral passion pervades every part. Marx does not address the actual ethical dilemmas that arise in practical situations, as would Lenin, Trotsky, Brecht, and others would, for better or worse, but at least Marx’s thoroughgoing humanism is laid bare, something which everyone should know in contravention of pervasive disinformation. And while this book is important to professional Marxology, its value is not limited to specialists.
(Lightly edited from original commentary on 5 May 2026, Marx’s birthday)
Karl Marx on Religion: Sources & Quotations
“Marx’s
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Revolutionary
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Marxist Humanism and Ethics
by Mihailo Marković
“Historical Praxis
as the Ground of Morality”
by Mihailo Marković, with Comment by Paul Kurtz
Moralism & Morality (Excerpt)
by Anthony Skillen
“Myth Today” (excerpt)
by Roland Barthes
Alvin Gouldner: Notes & Commentary
by
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Cornel West and Marxism: An Incomplete Review
by R. Dumain
The German Ideology
After 150 Years
by R. Dumain
Marx & the Individual Reconsidered: Selected Bibliography
compiled by R. Dumain
Offsite:
“Circular Against Kriege
by Marx & Engels
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